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0 Executive Summary 
The goal of this project was twofold. The first objective was to find out to what extent publicly 
available beneficiary data (from managing authorities and commercial databases) could be used for 
quantitative, econometric counterfactual analysis. This led to a second objective: in the countries and 
regions where data was most promising, a treatment effects analysis of the impacts of Cohesion 
Policy on innovation activities at the firm level has been conducted. 
Data requirements and collection 
Data from Belgium (Flanders), the Czech republic, France, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain and the UK (Wales and London) were examined for two crucial data requirements:  
i. it had to be possible to identify from the published beneficiary lists, which firms had been 
assisted (and which had not) . This is essential since counterfactual approaches compare the 
activities of beneficiary firms with an appropriate control group of firms that did not receive 
support. An appropriate control group contains a large enough sample of firms for a 
meaningful comparison;  
ii. information on innovation (or other business activities) and further firm characteristics, such 
as size and sector, had to be collected.  
Spain had to be eliminated from the analysis, since the published data did not specify the assisted 
firms clearly enough. Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Flanders, Wales and London were eliminated 
because of the relatively small number of innovation projects supported by Cohesion Policy. 
Data for the Czech Republic, France and Germany were processed using two different strategies:  
a) by linking the Cohesion Policy beneficiary lists to the Amadeus database that contains 
balance sheet data of firms from all EU countries. This was done for support recipients in 
France and the Czech Republic. Firms included in Amadeus that were not identified as 
Cohesion Policy grantees were used as control group. Both the identified recipients and the 
control group were then linked to a patent database, patent being used as a proxy variable for 
innovation activities at the firm level:  
b) for the German Cohesion Policy recipients more complete data were available.  These 
beneficiaries were linked to the German part of the Community Innovation Survey (the 
“Mannheim Innovation Panel" (MIP)). Similarly to the Amadeus database, this survey 
delivers a control group of firms (respondents within the survey that did not receive support 
from Cohesion Policy) as well as information on general firm characteristics. What is 
different, however, is the fact that the MIP contains several other measures of innovation 
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activities. Instead of only analyzing patenting behavior, this database allows investigating 
broader facts such as R&D investment and R&D employment, total innovation expenditure of 
firms, as well as their innovation outcomes (process innovations, product innovations, etc.). 
In the Czech Republic, 26,075 different grants were distributed within Cohesion Policy between 2006 
and 2011 amounting to a total budget of almost € 11 billion. As from the grant recipient lists it is not 
clear how many different recipients have received the 26,075 projects nor how many firms have been 
supported (as the beneficiary lists only include names of the awardees but not the type of the entity, 
i.e. a firm, a not-for-profit institution, a municipality or private person, for instance), all names were 
searched in the Amadeus database which contained addresses of 14,609 different firms. Among those, 
1,433 could be identified as Cohesion Policy recipients. 
The equivalent procedure has been applied to the French data where 36,858 projects were listed in the 
beneficiary data that amounted to almost € 16 billion. In the Amadeus database, 1,231 firms were 
identified as Cohesion Policy beneficiaries (out of about 900,000 firms in total in the Amadeus data). 
The German recipient data included 47,616 projects with a total amount of about € 9 billion. Although 
1,904 different firms could be identified in the MIP survey as Cohesion Policy recipients, the 
subsequent econometric analysis could only use 623 different recipient firms, as the other firms did 
not participate in the survey in the relevant years for this study (the years 2007 to 2010 where the 
current round of Cohesion Policy has been active). 
Econometric results – Czech Republic 
For the data of the Czech Republic, we applied a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator, i.e. 
patenting activity of recipient firms is compared over time and related to changes in patenting activity 
of the control group in the same time period. In this particular case, the pre-treatment phase was 
chosen to be patenting activity during the years 1993-2003 (time before the current round of Cohesion 
Policy) and the treatment period was chosen to be 2008 and 2009 (although the programme was 
formally active in 2006 and 2007, very few grants were distributed in these years). The overall 
patenting activity in the Czech Republic is characterized by a decline when the early 2000s are 
compared to the end of the 2000s. However, the econometric DiD estimation reveals that the treated 
firms actually suffered less from a reduction in patenting, as proxy for their overall innovation 
activities, than the control group of non-recipients in the same time period. While patent activity fell 
by 63% in control firms, it only fell by 14% in assisted firms (and, for reasons specified below, this 
probably understates the impact of Cohesion Policy). We thus conclude that Cohesion Policy had 
positive impacts on innovation in the Czech Republic. 
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Econometric results - France 
For the French data, the same procedure as in the Czech Republic has been applied. However, we 
cannot confirm positive impacts of Cohesion Policy in France. This is most likely due to the fact that 
the French recipient data lack some important information that has been present in the Czech data: the 
French authorities did not provide detailed dates of the approval of each project. Thus it was 
impossible to be certain about the "before" and "after" periods which possibly led to misclassification 
of firms as treated or non-treated, and consequently bias in the regression results. This problem cannot 
be solved without improved data reporting by the regional authorities themselves. The 
recommendations at the end of this summary will follow up on data reporting issues. 
Econometric results - Germany 
In the German case, we do not have panel data at our disposal, i.e. the DiD method cannot be applied. 
Although we use four years of the survey, most firms are only observed once in the respective time 
period. Therefore, we apply cross-sectional methods for constructing counterfactuals, in particular 
nearest neighbor matching. Using this method, each treated firm is compared to the most similar firm 
in the control group. As our control group is large (about 20,000 firms), the application of matching is 
feasible in the sense that for each treated firms, a very similar “twin” firm can be found. After the 
matching has been performed, one can compare the differences in innovation variables between the 
treated firms and the selected twin firms. If differences in the innovation (or “outcome”) variables are 
found, these can be attributed to the Cohesion Policy as two groups of firms do not differ in any other 
structural characteristic but the treatment receipt. After applying an initial matching estimation, it 
turns out that indeed the Cohesion Policy recipients score higher on a range of innovation indicators; 
for instance, R&D investment, R&D employment and total innovation investment, among others. 
As we have detailed information on other activities of the firms, however, we also find that the 
Cohesion Policy recipients are also more likely to benefit from other subsidies, e.g. from the Federal 
German Government, than the firms in the selected control group. Thus, the identified effects might 
be confounded with impacts of other subsidies. Therefore, we took this into account in a subsequent 
analysis. After controlling for other subsidies, the results with respect to the estimated treatments 
effects become slightly less favorable, but stay positive. However, we can no longer identify a 
separate effect of Cohesion Policy on R&D employment. This might be due to relatively small 
amounts of money that are granted per project in Germany (especially Eastern Germany), but more 
research on this issue would be needed in order to validate this hypothesis.  
In terms of magnitude of treatment effects, we find the following results after controlling for other 
subsidies that the firms might have gotten (more numbers are presented in the main body of the 
report): 
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Selected 
control 
group 
Subsidized 
firms 
Treatment effect on the treated 
Variable Mean Mean in percentage points 
R&D intensity 4.4% 6.2% 1.8%-points 
innovation intensity 7.3% 9.5% 2.2%-points 
investment intensity 31.9% 53.2% 21.3%-points 
Note: R&D (innovation) intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure (total innovation expenditure) divided by 
sales times 100, and investment intensity is calculated as gross investment into tangible assets divided by stock 
of tangible assets (at the beginning of the period under review). 
The subsidized firms in the German sample show an average R&D intensity of 6.2%. If they had not 
gotten a grant within the Cohesion Policy Programme, we estimate that they would have only 
achieved an R&D intensity of 4.4%. Thus the estimated treatment effect amounts to 1.8 percentage 
points. This number is not unreasonable. A representative subsidy recipient (the median firm in the 
sample) would have had R&D expenditure of 213,000 EUR and sales of 4,869,499 EUR (R&D 
intensity is about 4.4%) if it had not gotten the subsidy. As a response to the subsidy, it increases 
R&D expenditure to about 300,000 EUR according to our estimates. Thus, the treatment effect in 
terms of EUR amounts to 87,000 EUR, on average. This is plausible as the typical grant size in our 
German sample varies between 11,000 and 51,000 EUR. The estimated responses to a subsidy receipt 
are similar for total innovation investment and also for investment into tangible assets. 
Policy Recommendations 
The main lessons learned for policy actually deal with the goal concerning the feasibility of 
quantitative evaluations using the publicly available data on beneficiaries as published by the 
European Member States or regions respectively. During the data collection and preparation phase for 
the econometric application several shortcomings of the current reporting standards have been 
identified. This lack in data quality may result in measurement error and consequently in biased 
estimation results. Despite the fact that several countries or regions published their data in reasonable 
quality (examples in addition to the Czech Republic, France and Germany are Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Flanders, Wales, London, among others), none of them provided information at a level of 
detail desirable for an econometric evaluation. Typically, the names of the recipients, a project title, a 
date of approval and the granted amount in EUR or national currency are published. However, just 
minor improvements in reporting standards would facilitate the feasibility of future evaluations and 
their reliability enormously. For instance, in addition to the information already available future 
publications of beneficiary data on the Internet should include: 
(i) not only the name of the recipient but also the location to ease identification within text field 
searches of recipients in other external data resources; 
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(ii) instead of an approval date of the grant, a start date and end date of the envisaged project 
should be provided. This information is essential for assigning the “treatment period” 
correctly in time; 
(iii) the type of recipient should be provided at least in some rough categorical manner (e.g. firm 
vs. other entity); 
(iv) the purpose of the grant should be provided, i.e. innovation project, general business support, 
environment, energy, tourism, culture etc.; 
(v) and last but not least, the data should be published in database compatible formats and not as 
pdf documents or similar formats that cannot be imported into relational databases without 
further manipulation. 
Given these shortcomings in data reporting structure, the actual policy conclusions that can be 
drawn from the presented econometric analyzes are modest and should be interpreted with 
care. At the very least, the quantitative results suggest that Cohesion Policy had a positive effect on 
innovation activity in recipient firms. The magnitude of these effects should not necessarily be 
stressed too much. In fact, we believe our results underestimate the real effects as not all 
treatments could be accurately assigned to the correct timing of the actual grants and it could 
not be identified precisely which grants were meant for innovation projects and which for other 
purposes. Thus, in the present study we might take into account grants that were not meant for 
innovation, but we relate these to innovation outcomes. This will obviously underestimate the true 
effect of innovation grants. Nevertheless, in the country-case study of Germany, we could already 
support the hypothesis that Cohesion Policy is not a substitute for other policies but offers some 
unique programme features that leads to complementarity with, for instance, the German Federal 
grants for innovation projects.  
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1 Introduction 
European regional policy is designed to reduce the gap between the development levels of the various 
regions. From a scientific approach, regional policy brings added value to actions on the ground. The 
goal of this policy is to help to finance concrete projects for regions, towns and their inhabitants. The 
idea is to create potential so that the regions can fully contribute to achieving greater growth and 
competitiveness and, at the same time, to exchange ideas and best practices
1
. 
In this context, theCohesion Policy is spending some €80 billion on enterprise and innovation 
support in the current period, representing a higher amount than the one spent on transport or human 
resources. In fact, innovation is the only field to be a key priority for Cohesion Policy in all Member 
States. Yet, evidence of impacts of the funds attributed to enterprises and innovation is very uneven 
throughout the regions. The evaluations vary in quality from serious to poor or simply non-existent. 
Even the Member States or regions which deliver serious evaluations of the impact of the current 
program produce only descriptive evaluations. Hence, there are very few examples of quantitative, 
causal assessments using counterfactuals or comparison groups. For such a key policy, being able to 
rely on quantitative results on top of qualitative evaluations is thus crucial.  
In this vein, DG REGIO of the European Commission launched Work Package 6c of the ex 
post evaluation of cohesion policy 2000-2006, with the goal to pilot the use of such evaluations. The 
long term goal is to build up a body of evidence on enterprise support (including support for 
innovation and research) from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and have 
evaluations done on a regular basis. To this end, DG Regional Policy has commissioned: 
• An impact evaluation of ERDF support to enterprise (other than support specifically for innovation 
and research). 
• An impact evaluation of ERDF support specifically for innovation and research in enterprises - the 
current study. 
The two evaluations are conceived as complementary and parallel. The current study is divided into 2 
main parts; (a) data preparation, (b) econometric analysis, in particular the estimation of treatment 
effects using counterfactual analysis. 
As part of the contract, K.U.Leuven delivers hereby the final report five month after the interim 
meeting as agreed. 
                                                     
1
 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/why/index_en.htm 
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2  Goal of this project 
The goal of the proposed research project is an evaluation study of ERDF support for R&D and 
innovation, in particular the application of treatment effects estimators on beneficiaries of ERDF 
support. More specifically, the goal is to undertake such an analysis without conducting a special 
survey or interviews to collect the necessary data, but to investigate to which extent data published by 
the Member States’ benefiting regions can be used for such an analysis. More concretely, after 
assessing if, and to which extent, the published data by the Member States is usable for evaluation 
purposes, it will be explored to what extent the beneficiary firms of ERDF support would have 
engaged in innovation activities if they had not received public funding. The latter describes a 
counterfactual situation that cannot be observed, and thus has to be estimated with econometric 
techniques. The comparison of the actual innovation engagement of recipients with the estimated 
counterfactual situation then allows drawing conclusions on the effectiveness of the ERDF support on 
R&D and innovation. This exercise is highly interesting as the Member States select regions to be 
supported based on heterogeneous criteria and also favor different varieties of policy instruments. For 
instance, a country might favor policies for technological consultancy services whereas another 
country focuses on direct grants for proposed R&D projects. Thus, the variety of policy instruments 
applied across regions may have heterogeneous effects on enterprise innovation in the EU. 
Conducting the proposed exercise involves linking the published beneficiary information to 
firm level data, such as the AMADEUS database, and external innovation data, such as patent 
databases. Thus, the ultimate goal of the project is twofold: on the one hand, it will be a pilot study on 
counterfactual impact analysis of the ERDF, on the other hand, it will lead to advice on future 
reporting standards for the Member States in order to facilitate and improve future econometric 
evaluations.  
The following subsection will give a detailed overview of what has been done under task one. 
First we will present the data collection and merging exercise. Then, we will provide a detailed 
overview of the problems encountered and recommendations on how similar problems can be avoided 
in the future. Before going over to the econometric analysis of task two, we illustrate the steps of task 
one with an example using data from the Czech Republic. Subsequently, an analogous exercise is 
carried out using French data. Finally, we consider data from Germany.  
2.1 Task 1: Data preparation 
Information on beneficiaries of ERDF support has been collected from the following website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/commu/beneficiaries/index_en.htm 
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The goal of the present project is to conduct a counterfactual impact analysis of current ERDF 
policies on Czech Republic, France and Germany. These countries have been selected for the 
following reasons: (i) there were many projects granted to recipients in these regions (ii) the 
beneficiary data has been of reasonable quality (iii) external firm level and innovation data has been 
available for drawing a control group of non-recipient firms and for performing an econometric 
treatment effects analysis. In order to make a decision on the selected countries, data on many more 
regions needed to be collected as their quality was unknown to the research team. Only after 
assessment of the data quality per country, the Czech Republic, France and Germany were chosen for 
the subsequent econometric exercise. 
2.1.1 Examples of linked beneficiary data with firm level information 
Before we document how the data collection was performed at large scale, we briefly discuss a few 
examples of the linked grant data with firm level information so that the reader gets an impression of 
what kind of information is processed in the subsequent econometric applications. We use examples 
from German grant recipients here, as we have the most comprehensive firm-level data available for 
this country.  
Example 1:  
The first example is small technology-oriented company working on the development and production 
of specialty polymers and adhesives. Founded in 1996 they have been developing high-temperature 
resistant adhesives .At its research and production facility, products are customized to meet various 
technical requirements of the clients by using the technology of interpenetrating networks. In total, 
this firm received three grants within the current ERDF program. In 2008, a project was granted for 
the development of a nano-composite adhesive with a total value of € 227,000. In 2009, € 2,500 were 
granted for developing the company’s strategic business concept for the Chinese market, as well as € 
44,000 for entering the Chinese market for polymers.  
The employment of the company grew slightly since the year 2000 where they had 7 
employees. In 2010, the company had 10 employees, and except one all are R&D employees. 
According to our information the firm is permanently innovating products and processes, and spent on 
average about € 250,000 for innovation projects, on average. In 2005, the firm was nominated for an 
Innovation Prize of their regional government for a new product, a special fire prevention foam. 
Between 2002 and 2004, three patents were filed at the European Patent Office out of which two were 
granted. 
Despite its high innovativeness, the company never managed to translates its inventions into 
products that generate sales sufficient for survival. Although the company’s sales doubled between 
2001 and 2010, they are still very low. In the year 2010, the sales were not higher than € 200,000. 
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According to a German credit rating agency, the firm is in financial trouble. Last year’s balance sheet 
was characterized by negative equity, for instance. It is thus questionable whether the company can 
stay in the market. 
Example 2: 
The second company engages in manufacturing of high-quality endoscopic equipment for minimal-
invasive surgery and exports both accessories and complete systems to about 30 countries world-
wide. The products are being manufactured in an own production facility. The firm takes an active 
role in research. With its own R&D department it was able to develop products that have set standards 
in endo-surgery. Among other public support, several projects have been funded by the German 
government and are being tested by German university professors and clinics. 
The total employment of the company declined over the last 10 years from 45 to 28 
employees. On average, the firm spends about € 2 million of innovation projects per year and always 
had about 20 R&D employees in the last 10 years. In the last decade, the firm filed 9 patents at the 
European Patent Office out of which 2 were granted.  
Within the current round of the ERDF, the firm received three grants for its research on non-
invasive medical precision instruments. One in 2007 and one in 2008 had an amount of about € 2 
million each, and the third grant amounted to € 109,000 in 2009.  
Since the mid-2000s, the firm’s sales fluctuate around € 2 million per year.  
2.1.2 Collecting and merging the data of the retained regions 
This subsection describes how the data was collected at large scale, assessed and merged to other 
datasets. After having downloaded the data of all the beneficiary regions of the Member States, the 
ones that had data where the quality was judged to be sufficiently good for further analysis have been 
retained for the next step of the data preparation exercise (see Annex A for a detailed overview of the 
data), consisting in the conversion of all the collected data into a harmonized, data compatible format 
like e.g. excel. After this step, the separate regional sheets have been converted into complete 
database tables. All excel-sheets have been exported into separate ASCII files using tabs as a column 
delimiter. All exported files were then concatenated into one file. The resulting file has been exported 
into file formats that could be used with statistical software. 
The next step consisted in linking this publicly available data to an external dataset, i.e. the 
Amadeus database of Bureau Van Dijk in the case of the Czech Republic and France and the 
Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) for Germany. These linkages allow getting further information of 
the beneficiary firms, and further allow drawing a control group of non-beneficiaries for each selected 
region.  
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Subsequently, innovation data has been collected for both, the selected beneficiaries and the 
control groups. For the cases of the Czech Republic and France, the research team focused on patent 
data as innovation indicator. Although patents are admittedly a somewhat narrow measure of 
innovation (see e.g. Griliches, 1990, for a survey on the pros and cons of patent data for economic 
analysis), they have the advantage that data for the entire patentee population is available for a long 
time period (1978 until to date) for the whole EU27. Different sources of patent data have been used. 
First, the database of the European Patent Office (EPO) has been searched. Second, the PATSTAT 
database has been used. In comparison to the EPO database, the PATSTAT database does not only 
cover patent filing to the EPO but also to 40 different national patent offices. However, the quality of 
the applicant names and addresses is lower in the PATSTAT than in the EPO database. 
For the German counterfactual exercise, the research team established a link of the 
beneficiary data to the Mannheim Innovation Panel. Unlike the patent databases that cover the 
population of patents, the MIP is an annual survey of German firms. Thus it does not cover the 
population of firms, but a randomly drawn, representative sample of the German business sector each 
year. It has the advantage that other innovation measures than only patent data can be investigated. 
The links between the various data sources has been established by using a text field search 
engine that allows highly sophisticated string searches across databases. The search engine allows 
minimizing potential wrong matches due to different spellings of firm names or firm variations. This 
technique is outlined in Appendix C of this report. All potential hits of the text field search engine 
have been manually checked. 
During the data preparation task, several problems and drawbacks were encountered. The 
following subsection intends to clarify what these caveats consisted in and gives recommendations on 
how they could be avoided in the future. 
 
2.2 Caveats and recommendations 
A first major drawback rendering the data collection exercise cumbersome is the way the data are 
reported by the Member States. The data of the various regions are published in many different 
formats (like e.g. html, excel, word, pdf), some of which are not database compatible formats. Hence, 
before being able to use the publicly available data (even for very basic exercises like mere 
descriptive statistics for example), the latter have to be converted into a database compatible format. 
For example, some countries provide easily accessible data on Microsoft Excel format which can be 
collected in one large beneficiary database. Others, however, are in various HTML formats which 
either requires a manual “copy-paste” collection or the development of some “web-crawling” 
software (or similar procedures) that identifies fields (such as beneficiary name, date of funding, 
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amount of funding) in the HTML source code and translates it into a database-readable format. 
Finally, some data is just provided as pdf documents which will require a fully manual transformation 
of the provided information into a database. Hence, depending on the original format of the data, this 
conversion process can be very complex, time-consuming and requiring advanced IT skills. The table 
in appendix A provides a detailed overview of the different formats the data is available on the 
regional websites.  
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A second drawback is the use of special characters included in the alphabet of some EU 
countries (see e.g. Czech Republic). Those characters can render the above mentioned exercise of 
constructing spreadsheets like e.g. excel into ASCII files substantially more cumbersome as some of 
these special characters are not recognized as letters. Hence, some advanced IT skills allowing to 
circumvent this issue are needed.  
On similar grounds, sometimes the published information is solely available in the national 
language of the concerned country. For certain languages, this can render the researcher’s job 
substantially more difficult, as he or she might not be able to properly understand what the various 
projects/purposes of the regions are about. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 1: Harmonized format of data publication  
All the Members States should publish their data in the same, database compatible format (or at 
least a database compatible format).  
This would highly facilitate and accelerate the data collection exercise. It would allow to 
immediately export the different regional spreadsheets into ASCII files, enabling to export the 
data into almost any statistical software.  
 
 
Recommendation 2: Avoidance of special characters and common language (optional) 
Since special characters used in some of the EU languages can render the data conversion exercise 
increasingly difficult (and might even cause the loss of some observations), it would be 
recommended that such characters be avoided to the largest extent, by e.g. publishing the data-
related information in a common language like for instance English. Of course, special characters 
cannot be avoided in the beneficiary names in certain languages. 
Having the information available in English would further allow having a better understanding of 
what the different projects are about, allowing for more precise evaluations (i.e. evaluations on a 
specific topic). As will be demonstrated in the following subsection, the lack of understanding the 
project categories might render it impossible to evaluate solely projects of a specific purpose, given 
that the evaluator might be unable to differentiate between the different projects categories. 
Note: The research team is aware that these two recommendations are very sensitive issues and 
might not be realistic propositions for Member States (hence, optional). They are issues that can be 
dealt with. However, for reasons of completeness, the research team felt they should be mentioned 
as part of the recommendations in the present report. 
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The lack of information published by the managing authorities constitutes a further 
important shortcoming of the way in which Member States currently publish their data. In order to be 
able to use an observation for econometric analysis, more information about the beneficiary is needed 
than is published by the managing authorities. As already previously explained, the data is matched to 
other datasets. However, this exercise is often not possible because we do not have the necessary 
information to complete this match between two datasets. As a matter of fact, many of the websites 
only provide names of the recipients but not the full address. While this might seem sufficient, it can 
cause important caveats when trying to merge the beneficiary data to other databases like e.g. the 
Amadeus data or patent databases. If a firm name exists several times in a same region, which can 
easily happen, or many similar names exist, it will be impossible to identify which of those firms is 
the actual recipient of a subsidy when merging the data to external firm level data. This can lead to a 
substantial loss of observations in the treated as well as in the control group (see next section for an 
illustration). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Additional information that is missing for many regions is the exact duration of the project. 
While some regions report start and end dates, this is not done systematically by all of them. Having 
information about yearly expenses would even be more useful, as one could take the distribution of 
money spent over time into account. 
Recommendation 3: More detailed information on beneficiaries I 
It would be recommended to complete and harmonize the way regions report the information on 
the beneficiaries. The reported information should include: 
- The full name of the recipient 
- In the case of firms: the legal form of the firm 
- The complete address (including zip-code) of the recipient  
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Finally, many of the ERDF beneficiaries are not firms, but local authorities or universities or 
other, non-profit organizations. Those beneficiaries cannot be found in the Amadeus database and as a 
consequence, no hit can be found for the latter. Furthermore, often it is not possible to distinguish the 
various purposes of the attributed grants because they are not reported by topic. 
 
Recommendation 4: More detailed information on beneficiaries II 
It would be recommended to have information on the exact duration of the project and the 
amount of money spent per year. Having information on yearly project expenditures would 
allow us to take the distribution of expenses over time into account. Hence, ideally, regions 
would report: 
- Amount of money spent per year (in €) 
- Start date of the project 
- End date of the project 
 
In case this would be too cumbersome for the Member States in terms if reporting, having the 
starting and finishing date would already be helpful: 
- Start of project 
- End of project 
 
Finally, in order to avoid inaccuracies when converting national currencies into Euros, it would 
be recommended that all the amounts could be reported in Euros. As a matter of illustration, the 
Czech exchange rate had fluctuations of up to 20% during the period under review.   
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Recommendation 5: Clearer structure in the reporting of the data 
In order to avoid ambiguities to the largest extent possible, it would be recommended that the 
beneficiaries be reported according to whether they are private firms or municipalities, public research 
centers / universities or other organization that would not be found in external firm datasets.  
In a similar vein, and in line with has been suggested in the 1
st
 recommendation, the projects should be 
reported by topic. This would allow having a clear overview of how many subsidies have been spent 
for what purposes. In our case, this would allow us to identify the beneficiaries of public support for 
innovation and R&D. If the reporting does not allow this, it may be possible to identify the purpose of 
the project through text field searches in the titles of the particular grants, or from other information on 
the different policy actions taken in the beneficiary regions (e.g. regions could be identified on basis of 
their proposed policy instruments so that the selection focuses on regions that included a large part of 
measures dedicated to innovation). However, the latter method is much more time consuming and less 
precise. Furthermore, if the information is published in a language unknown to the investigator, it might 
well be that the purpose of the grant might not be identified accurately.  
Hence, ideally, the data would be organized as follows. The categorization below is based upon 
European Union, Directorate-General for Regional Policy (2010).  
- Private firm beneficiaries 
o Innovation 
o Research and Development 
o Business support 
o Information and communication technologies (ICT) 
o Environment 
o Energy 
o Transport 
o Urban and rural development 
o Tourism and culture 
o Education and social  
- Local / regional / national authority beneficiaries 
o Idem  
- Public research center / university beneficiaries 
o Idem  
-  Other non-profit organization beneficiaries 
o Idem   
- Etc.  
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Lastly, it has to be noted that one important recommendation is of course that the data 
reporting structure be the same in all the Member States. Appendix B provides a table suggesting how 
the reporting structure could be improved. 
2.3 Illustration using data from the Czech Republic 
In this subsection, we demonstrate how the above explained caveats impacted the data collection and 
merging exercises in the case of the Czech Republic, and what the consequence is for the data that 
will be used in the subsequent analysis.  
We will start by giving the example of a successful match, meaning a successful link between 
the publicly available data and the Amadeus dataset. In other words, the beneficiary firm could 
successfully be linked to a firm of the Amadeus dataset using an automated search engine: 
 
Example 1: Successful match 
searched found identity equal beneficiary city 
3633   1 Lias Vintírov, lehkýstavební 
materiál k.s. 
 
3633 CZ46882324 99.87  lias vintirov, lehkystav. 
material k.s. 
chodov u 
karlovych var 
1 
 Given that the name of the searched firm and the found firm is exactly the same and that only 
one firm was found in the external dataset, it appears trustworthy to assume that the found firm is the 
actual beneficiary of the grant. Hence, this is a successful hit and we can include this firm in our 
sample of treated firms, merging it with all the additional information we could obtain form the 
external dataset. Note, however, that it could be the case in unfortunate situation that a hit is assigned 
mistakenly. The Amadeus database might not contain all firms of a country. Thus it could happen that 
the actual beneficiary is not included in the Amadeus database, but a firm with a similar (or the same 
name). Only information on the firm’s address could further help to verify the match. 
Example 2 provides an illustration where the success of the match is less straightforward and 
thus requires manual checking. As we can see in the table, the search engine found several firms 
containing the word “BEST” in their name, and hence suggests all of them as potential hits for the 
funded firm. In this case, after manual check, we can conclude that the first firm is the correct one, 
since this is the only one where the name coincides 100% and where the legal form is the same. As a 
consequence, we can include this firm in our sample of treated firms. Even though this is more time-
consuming, no observations will be lost for a subsequent matching analysis.    
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Example 2: Usable match after manual verification 
searched Found identity equal beneficiary City 
690   9 BEST, a.s.,  
690 CZ25201859 100 1 BEST, A.S., KAZNEJOV 
690 CZ25328476 100  BEST TRANSPORT, A.S. BRNO 34 
690 CZ25573322 100  BEST - BUSINESS, A.S. VYSKOV 1 
690 CZ25769090 100  BEST HOLDING PRAHA, 
A.S. 
PRAHA 614 
690 CZ00505579 99.81  BEST I.A., A.S. PRAHA 7 
690 CZ45796360 99.81  BEST, S.R.O. BENESOV U 
PRAHY 
690 CZ46580743 99.81  BEST, S.R.O. OPAVA 7 
690 CZ60281022 99.81  METAL - BEST - LIBEREC, 
S.R.O. 
LIBEREC 1 
690 CZ60744995 99.81  BEST BOJKOVICE, S.R.O. BOJKOVICE 
690 CZ62029592 99.81  AGRO - BEST, S.R.O. CHOCEN 1 
 
Example 3 illustrates a case for which even after manual check, it was not possible to attribute 
a match to the concerned beneficiary firm. The title of the beneficiary firm is contained in all of the 
potential hits. Since we have no information on the exact location or the legal form, it is impossible to 
identify the firm in an external dataset. Hence, no further information about the firm (like e.g. size, 
sector etc) can be obtained and the observation cannot be used for econometric analysis. As a 
consequence, this firm will be taken out of the population of beneficiaries. Furthermore, as we are 
unable to tell which one of the potential hits is the actual funded firm, we do not know for sure which 
one did not get funding either. Hence, all of the potential hits have to be deleted as control 
observations as well. Otherwise we would run the risk of using an actual beneficiary as control 
observation. 
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Example 3: Un-usable match 
searched found identity equal beneficiary city 
12553   9 Vysocina  
12553 CZ00112062 100  ZEMEDELSKE DRUZSTVO 
VYSOCINA ZELIV 
ZELIV 
12553 CZ00125202 100  ZEMEDELSKE DRUZSTVO 
VYSOCINA 
HLINSKO V 
CECHACH 1 
12553 CZ25250213 100  AGRO VYSOCINA BYSTRE 
AKCIOVA SPOLECNOST 
BYSTRE U 
POLICKY 
12553 CZ25573004 100  ZEMEDELSKA, A.S. 
VYSOCINA 
HLINSKO V 
CECHACH 1 
12553 CZ26272211 100  SERVISCENTRUM 
VYSOCINA S.R.O. 
JIHLAVA 1 
12553 CZ26297451 100  DRUBEZ - VYSOCINA, 
S.R.O. 
MORAVSKE 
BUDEJOVICE 2 
12553 CZ46992189 100  VYSOCINA, A.S. TREST 
12553 CZ47238381 100  VYSOCINA VYKLANTICE, 
A.S. 
VYKLANTICE 
12553 CZ49810162 100  VELKOOBCHOD 
VYSOCINA, S.R.O. 
LEDEC NAD 
SAZAVOU 
12553 CZ60850973 100  VYSOCINA DOLNI 
HRACHOVICE, SPOL. S R.O. 
MLADA VOZICE 
 
Lost observations for further analysis and quality of the remaining data – Example of the Czech 
Republic 
In the case of the Czech Republic, which comparatively has data of good quality, many observations 
were lost for further analysis, mainly due to two reasons: 
 
 A first reason is the lack of information, as illustrated by the example here above. 
 A second reason the fact that not all ERDF recipients are firms, but some are municipalities, 
universities, hospitals etc., which cannot be found in external firm level datasets. 
 
As an illustration of how this impacted the total number of observations, consider the following 
figures: the total number of ERDF beneficiaries amounts to 26,075; the number of firms 
successfully matched to the Amadeus dataset amounts to 3,669. Hence, 22,406 beneficiaries could 
not be matched to an external dataset. 
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To be able to have a more complete picture of how many beneficiaries are not found in external 
datasets because of lacking information (but are private firms and supposedly contained in the dataset) 
and how many beneficiaries cannot be found because are not contained in a firm level dataset 
(because they concern other beneficiary units than firms), it would be useful, as explained in the 
previous section, if the beneficiaries were reported according to the type of entity.  
Furthermore, is has to be noted that the 3,669 firms that have been found in the Amadeus 
dataset and will be used for subsequent econometric analysis concern subsidies on all the types of 
purposes cumulated. In other words, with the data at hand, it was not possible to determine the 
purpose of the grants. Hence, this final dataset does not only concern firms that received support for 
innovation and R&D, but this dataset contains beneficiary firms for any kind of project that received 
EDRF support. As a consequence, it might be difficult to evaluate the effect of innovation subsidies 
on firms’ innovation activity. One should not expect to find effects on innovation activity if grants are 
interpreted as a treatment, although the purpose of the project was not related to innovation at all. 
It also has to be noticed that some “questionable” figures have been found in the data. For 
example, the four smallest amounts of ERDF support in the Czech Republic that have been reported 
by beneficiary regions range between 22 and 75 Euros. The four largest amounts allocated range 
between 110,862,300 and 154,182,860 Euros
2
. As one can see, these amounts differ immensely, to the 
point where some additional information on the data would be desirable. Do those 22 Euros concern a 
real ERDF contribution, and the concerned firms should stay in the sample, or is this merely the 
reimbursement of the delivery fees of unsuccessful project proposals, and the concerned firms should 
be taken out of the sample or serve in the control group? Or are we simply facing a reporting error and 
the concerned firms should be taken out altogether?  
In the above sections, we used the Czech Republic as an illustration on what kind of problems 
we encountered when preparing the data for the analysis. It has to be noted though, that similar 
problems were encountered for the other countries as well and that these caveats are by no means 
specific to the Czech Republic.  
Retained countries 
During the inception phase, the feasibility of receiving the Spanish beneficiary data in a database 
compatible format had been assessed. As this was not possible, Spain was not retained for further 
analysis.  
Other regions that had been considered during the inception phase were Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Flanders, Wales and London. Unfortunately, because of the low number of beneficiaries, 
                                                     
2
 The conversion from Czech crones to Euros has been made with the exchange rate of January 1
st
 of each year 
under review. 
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these countries/regions could not be retained for further econometric analysis. Hence, after the 
assessment under task 1, it has been decided that the regions of the Czech Republic and France will be 
retained for task 2. Finally, since we managed to convert the German data into a database compatible 
format and to merge the Cohesion Policy beneficiaries with data of the Mannheim Innovation Panel 
(MIP), Germany has been retained for the accomplishment of task 3.  
3 Cohesion Policy in the Czech Republic 
3.1 Some descriptive statistics 
Here below we will display some descriptive statistics on the Czech Republic data. Figure 1 
displays the number of projects granted per year. In total, some 26,075 projects have been supported 
by the EU Cohesion Policy in the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2011 for a total amount of 
€10,747,210,000 (average amount per project: € 412,265). The bars (linked to the left axis) show the 
number of projects granted per year
3
 and the curve (linked to the right axis) displays the percentage of 
projects granted per year out of the total number of accepted projects. 
Figure 1: Number of projects granted per year 
 
Figure 2 presents the repartition of the granted project by funding type. 
                                                     
3
Even though it cannot be recognized on the chart, in 2006 1 project was granted in the Czech Republic and in 
2007 34 projects were granted. 
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Figure 2: Number of projects granted per year by funding type 
 
 
Finally, Figure 3 presents the amounts allocated per year. As can be seen by this graph, the 
average amount attributed per year is very volatile. Hence, as previously explained, it would be useful 
to have the expenditures per year, allowing to take the duration and the money allocation over time 
per project into account. Being able to calculate monthly expenditures per project would enable to 
take the distribution of the grants over time into account. Indeed, one would expect that the most of 
the money gets spent after the kick-off period, and that there are less expenditures the beginning and 
the end of the project duration.  
Figure 3: Amount allocated per year 
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3.2 Task 2: Econometric Application 
The Amadeus database contains 14,609 firms. Out of those, 1,722 are dropped. These are firms that 
were suggested as potential hits by the text field search engine when the beneficiary data was linked 
to the Amadeus database. However, during the manual checks, we did not confirm these entries as a 
“hit”, as the information could not be verified accurately (see the example 2 on page 12 of this report). 
As we want to avoid that the control group mistakenly contains actual recipients, we exclude the non-
assigned, potential hits from the further analysis. 
The remaining sample contains 1,433 firms that got a project grant, and 11,454 firms that can serve as 
control group for the estimation of a treatment effect, i.e. an effect of the grants on the innovation 
activity of firms.
4
 
The Amadeus data provides information on firm size, sector of economic activity and various other 
characteristics, such as location, operating margin, cash flow, number of subsidiaries and the number 
of shareholders. For our initial match we used an old version of the Amadeus that covers the time 
period from 1997 to 2004. It seemed to be appropriate to use an old edition of Amadeus as this allows 
finding firms that possibly went out of business recently. If one would use an up-to-date Amadeus 
edition, it would not include information on firms that went out of business even if data for earlier 
periods existed. Using the old version of the Amadeus database, however, has the disadvantage that 
newly founded firms would not have been found when the beneficiary data has been linked to the firm 
level data. 
The data on the Cohesion Policy grants cover the time period from 2006 to 2011. As, however, the 
patent data has only been available until 2009 at the time of the data preparation, the years 2010 and 
2011 of the project grants cannot be considered. Note that patent databases typically suffer from a 
time lag concerning the data input. The most recent edition of the PatStat database includes patents 
from 2010, but it cannot be considered to be complete. At the earliest, the 2012 edition will have the 
complete information for the year 2010. The firms included in the Amadeus database cover about 
24% of all Czech patenting activity in the world (the PatStat database covers the European Patent 
Office as well as US and Japanese patents and patents of about 40 other national patent offices). 
The patent database covers all patent applications from 1978 to 2009 (at the time of data preparation). 
We use information starting in the year 1997 (the first year where we have information from the 
Amadeus database. 
                                                     
4
Note that 3,669 projects could be linked to the Amadeus database. This does not correspond to 3,669 different 
firms as some firms got multiple grants within the program. 
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Our database is thus consisting of 4 major “data blocks”. The data consists of the treatment group and 
the control group as well as two major time periods: the pre-treatment time, 1997 to 2005, and the 
time where the program has been active, 2006 to 2009. As this is panel data, that is, firms and their 
characteristics can be traced over time, we can apply a simple, yet very powerful estimator for 
program evaluation: the difference-in-difference estimator. For this, we initially only use the patent 
data and the treatment information. 
The idea of the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator is based on exploiting the panel structure. 
Consider a scenario, where we only have two time periods for simplicity: a pre-treatment period, and 
post treatment period, or more precisely in our case, a time period where the program to be evaluated 
is active. We can observe both the treated firms and control observations in both time periods. 
The DiD estimator works as follows: We could calculate the difference in patenting activity over time 
for both the treated firms and the control group: 
i
T
 = PATi,t1 – PATi,t0 
j
C
 = PATj,t1 – PATj,t0 
where T denotes the treatment group and C the control group. The treatment group receives a 
treatment, here the project grant, in period t1. We thus calculate the growth of patenting activity over 
time. As the growth of patenting activity may well be subject to economic shocks that concern the 
whole economy, one relates the growth of patenting of the treatment group to the growth of patenting 
of the control group. The underlying assumption is that both treated and control group would be 
affected by economic shocks in the same manner. We would thus be able to estimate the treatment 
effect α as difference in the both differences: 
αDiD = E(i
T
) – E(j
C
). 
The expected value would simply be estimated as the sample average of patenting growth in the 
treatment and control group respectively. A test whether the treatment effect is positive, that is, the 
program increases innovation activity, could simply be implemented by a simple two-sample t-test on 
mean differences in this example.  
As our database has not only two periods but multiple years, we implement this test by a simple fixed 
effects regression (within estimator). We use following time periods for this regression: we use 1997-
2003 as pre-treatment period and observe the patenting activity in each year for the treatment and the 
control group. Although the program started in 2006, the descriptive statistics above show that grants 
were only distributed systematically in 2008. Therefore we omit all years between 2003 and 2008, and 
thus our treatment period corresponds to 2008 and 2009.  
We are thus interested whether the average patenting activity in 2008 and 2009 of the treated firms is 
larger than in 1997 to 2003 relative to the control group of not-treated firms. Therefore we define two 
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dummy variables: TREAT and CONTROL. These two dummy variables are equal to one in the years 
2008 and 2009 for the TREATED firms and for the CONTROL firms, respectively. Using these two 
dummy variables, we run the following regression: 
 
The term c is the firm-specific effect, that is the average patenting activity of firm i. This captures the 
average patenting activity for all firms in the sample. The coefficient b1 will capture the difference in 
the patenting activity of the treated firms between the pre-treatment periods and the treatment period 
(TREAT is equal to zero in 1997 to 2003, and then takes unit value in 2008 and 2009). CONTROL is 
defined accordingly for the control observations, and thus the coefficient b2 indicates the difference in 
the corresponding time periods for the control firms. The treatment effect for this version of the 
difference in difference estimator is thus given as αDiD= b1 – b2, or in other words, we are interested 
whether b1> b2. 
As patents are a count variable, an OLS regression is not the most appropriate estimation technique to 
be applied. Patents are a strictly non-negative integer variable, i.e. they takes values 0, 1, 2, 3, and so 
forth. In addition, the sample will contain many zeros as not all firms patent. Actually only a minority 
of firms typically files patents. Therefore, researchers typically apply count data models instead of 
linear regression as these are more efficient compared to OLS, that is, the estimates are more precise 
(smaller standard errors of the coefficients). Here we consequently apply a fixed effects Poisson 
regression (with fully robust standard errors). 
3.2.1 Version 1: Estimation using a “wrong“ treatment indicator 
As we described above the variable TREAT identifies the funding recipients in the period 2008 and 
2009. Actually, this is not an accurate definition of the treatment indicator as there are firms in the 
data that only received the treatment after 2009. However, we would like to show this regression, as it 
nicely illustrates a bias arising from potentially poorly reported recipient data. The Czech recipient 
data actually contains information on the date of funding which we will use in the 2
nd
 version of the 
estimation. We show this “wrong” definition of the treatment indicator, however, as in the case of 
France the authorities did not report the funding date systematically and thus our estimation reported 
in the subsequent section on the French case may be subject to bias due to poor data quality on the 
recipient firms. 
In total the regression is performed with 12,887 firms and 9 year, resulting in 115,983 firm-year 
observations. The regressions results in following coefficients (and standard errors in brackets) 
 b1 =  -0.310  (0.131) ** 
 b2 =  -1.025  (0.167) *** 
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*** indicate a significance level of 1% and ** of 5%.  
As we see, the patenting activity in the sample of Czech firms declined in 2008/9 when compared to 
1997-2003, as both coefficients have a negative sign. However, we also find that the patenting in the 
control group reduces more than in the treatment group. The actual growth rates are -63% [= exp(-
1.025) -1] and -27% [= exp(-.31)-1]. The declining innovation activity might the result of a negative 
economic shock, e.g. the financial crisis.  
In order to test whether the treatment effect, the difference in the coefficients, is significantly different 
from zero, we use a Wald test. The test statistic amounts to 11.35, which is significant at the 1% level. 
We thus reject the null hypothesis of equally sized coefficients and conclude that the treatment effect 
of the ERDF grants is positive in this setting.  
3.2.2 Version 2: Estimation with a corrected treatment indicator 
In this version of the estimation we take the timing of the treatment into account. Now the variable 
TREAT only switches from 0 to 1 in the year when the recipient firm got the grant. This is obviously 
a more accurate definition of the treatment variable as beforehand some recipient firms were 
considered as being treated although they received the grant only after the period that is covered by 
our data.  
 b1 =  -0.149  (0.131) 
 b2 =  -1.025  (0.167) *** 
*** indicate a significance level of 1% and ** of 5%.  
Now we actually find that the patenting activity of the treated firms did not significantly reduce in 
2008/2009 when compared to the pre-treatment period (the reduction amounts to exp(-0.149) – 1 = 
13.8%, but the coefficient b1 is not significantly different from zero). At the same time, however, the 
patenting activity of the control group did decline exactly by the same amount as in the previous 
version (this is of course expected as the control group did not change). We again use the Wald test on 
a significant difference of the two coefficients b1 and b2 and find that the Null hypothesis of equal 
coefficient is rejected at the 1% level (the test statistic amounts to 12.7). We thus conclude that the 
treatment effect is positive and that it is larger in the case where we can use the exact funding years 
for construction the treatment indicator when compared to the situation where we cannot use the 
information on timing of the grant. 
Overall we conclude that the treated firms were thus better able to keep up their innovation activities 
in a time period where innovation activity as measured by patent counts reduced in the economy. This 
effect can be attributed to the ERDF program.  
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Although we find positive results here, it is still difficult to interpret the magnitude of the effect in 
terms of “policy significance” rather than statistical significance. Although we took the timing of the 
grants into account, we cannot really tell which grants were actually meant for innovation projects and 
which grants had other goals such as investments into physical assets, for instance. This could only be 
disentangled if this information were included in the beneficiary data as we recommended in Chapter 
2 of this report. Thus, our positive findings on innovation may even underestimate the actual impact 
of Cohesion Policy as we now take treatments into account that were not at all directed at stimulating 
innovation in the Czech Republic. 
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4 Cohesion Policy in France 
4.1 Some descriptive statistics 
A total amount of € 15,809,310,000 has been spent for 36,858 projects in France for the period under 
review. This amounts to an average amount of € 428,983 per project.5 
As we can see by Figure 4, Nord-Pas de Calais is the region that got most money, with a total 
of € 1,396,955,300 and Corsica the one that got the least money, with a total of € 149,788,110.6 
Figure 4: Amount allocated per region 
 
                                                     
5
 Note that for 35 projects, neither a beneficiary region nor a funding source could be identified.  
6
 Multiregion concerns money attributed to projects over several regions. 
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The number of projects per region also differs strongly, as can be seen by Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Number of projects per region 
 
As we can see, most projects are done by Nord-Pas de Calais, with a total number of 3,814 
projects and the region with the least number of porjects is Martinique, with a total number of 230 
projects for the period under review.
7
 
As is displayed be Figure 6, roughly 70% of all the supported projects have been financed by the 
European Social Fund (FSE).
8
 
 
 
                                                     
7
 Multiregion concerns projects covering several regions.  
8
 FEDER stands for Fonds Européen de Développement Régional.  
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Figure 6: Number of supported projects by funding source 
 
 
If we consider the funding source by regions, we see in Figure 7 that Ile-de-France gets the highest 
amount of financed projects from the FSE (with a total of 3,544 projects), and Midi-Pyrénée by the 
FEDER (with a total of 1,066 projects). The region with the fewsest supported projects is Alsace for 
the FEDER (161 projects) and Martinique for the FSE (64 projects). 
 
30 
 
Figure 7: Number of supported projects by funding source by region 
 
 
4.2 Task 2: Econometric Application 
In the French case, the Amadeus database contains 902,394 firms. Out of those 1,231 were identified 
as Cohesion Policy beneficiaries. 7,717 firms are dropped from the further analysis as they appeared 
as potential hit in the text field search of beneficiaries in the Amadeus database, but were not 
confirmed as hit after the manual checks. Note, however, that the vast majority of firms (890, 263) did 
never file any patent between 1978 and 2009.  
The data structure is exactly the same as in the case of the Czech Republic. The pre-treatment phase 
refers to the years 1997 to 2003, and the treatment phase considered as 2007 and 2008. We cannot use 
2009 here, as unlike in the Czech Republic’s case, we restricted the patent search to the European 
Patent Office (EPO). The French number of firms turned out to the too large to be searched in global 
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patent data. It turned out, however, that the EPO data is fairly incomplete for 2009 at the time of 
writing this report. Therefore, we restrict the analysis to the years 2007 and 2008 with respect to the 
time phase where the program has been active. The patent data that we collected for the firms 
included in the Amadeus database covers about 78% of all French patent activity at the EPO for the 
corresponding time period. 
Analogously to the Czech Republic’s data, we apply a DiD estimation using a Poisson fixed effects 
regression, and obtain the following coefficients for the TREAT (b1) and CONTROL (b2) .  
 b1 =  -0.659  (0.290) ** 
 b2 =  -0.748  (0.127) *** 
*** indicate a significance level of 1% and ** of 5%.  
Here we also see that the overall patent activity declined in 2007/2008 (when compared to 1997 to 
2003). Unlike in the Czech’s Republic case, however, we do not find a significant difference between 
the two coefficients. We thus cannot conclude here that the Cohesion Policy programme resulted in 
more innovation as measured by EPO patents in the recipient firms.  
In the case above, we again used a treatment indicator that is not fully accurate. There might be firms 
considered as treated firms in the period 2007/2008 although they only received a grant after this time 
period. Unfortunately the French recipient data does not include systematic information on the timing 
of the grants which makes a more meaningful evaluation impossible. We found out that in some 
project titles which are included in the recipient database, dates of funding were reported. We extract 
those dates from the titles’ text fields and used that information to construct a more accurate treatment 
indicator that takes the timing of the grants into account. Unlike in the Czech case, this information is 
not reported systematically in the French data, however. We could only obtain information on the 
time of the grant for 319 firms out of the 1,231 that were identified as grant recipients in total. When 
using this more refined, but small treatment group the results did not improve. We still do not find a 
significantly positive treatment effect for the French data. 
Thus we cannot conclude from our econometric analysis that the Cohesion Policy led to increased 
innovation activities in the recipient firms. However, this does not mean that there were no real effects 
in France. Instead, this inconclusive finding could be a result of the poor quality of the recipient data 
in France. 
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5 Cohesion Policy in Germany 
5.1 Some descriptive statistics 
Between 2005 and 2012, a total amount of € 9,060,653,000 has been spent on 47,616 projects in 
Germany. 
As can be seen by Figure 8, the distribution of the attributed amounts varies greatly between the 
various German Laender, ranging from €1,699,701,000 in Sachen-Anhalt to €109,875,000 in 
Saarland.  
Figure 8: Amount distribution by Bundesland (in € million) 
 
 
In total, Eastern Germany received a total amount of € 3,067,674,000 for 33,201 projects 
(average amount per project of €92,400) and Western Germany € 5,993,036,000 for 14,415 projects 
(average amount per project of € 415,923). 
Figure 9 displays the number of projects granted per year.
9
 
                                                     
9
 Even though it is not recognizable on the graph, in 2005, 4 projects were financed, in 2006, 13 projects and in 
2010, 2 projects. 
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Figure 9: Number of projects granted per year 
 
Figure 10 presents the average amount of money allocated per year. 
Figure 10: Amount allocated per year 
 
 
In the following sub-section, we will proceed to an econometric analysis using additional data 
retrieved from the German MIP, as agreed during the interim meeting.  
5.2 Task 3: Econometric application using additional data sources 
In addition to the Czech and French data, we consider Germany as a third country case study. This 
helps us to overcome some limitations of the data in the two countries considered above.  
 In the recipient data, not all regions clearly indicate which grant was distributed within policy 
schemes that have the goal of fostering innovation in a region. Thus, it may occur that we 
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consider a grant as a treatment towards innovation activity, but in fact this was not the main 
goal of the policy. Thus, we could underestimate the treatment effects, as we may not be able 
to distinguish accurately between innovation projects and others. In the German recipient 
data, we cannot identify either whether a grant was meant for innovation activity, but in the 
firm-level data we use, we can identify which firms did at all engage in innovation activities. 
Although still not ideal, we can at least exclude grant recipients from the analysis that did not 
at all conduct or even plan any innovation activities. 
 Recipient firms may have used other sources of public funding in addition to Cohesion Policy. 
In this case, we might overestimate the treatment effects resulting from Cohesion Policy as 
the firms’ budgets were actually supplemented by other public resources. In the German data, 
we have information for a subsample of firms on whether they have received other public 
subsidies for innovation projects. Consequently, we will investigate how the estimated 
treatment effects change if other public resources are taken into account. 
 With the publicly available data in the French and Czech case study, we could only use 
patents as a proxy variable for innovation activity. As it is commonly known, patents are a 
narrow measure for innovation (see Griliches, 1990, for instance). Thus it would be desirable 
to investigate a region where other, more comprehensive innovation data could be used. The 
Community Innovation Surveys are a potential source, and the research team has access to 
non-anonymised micro data. Thus, we can link the Cohesion Policy data to the German part 
of the Community Innovation Survey, and can investigate a broader set of innovation 
variables, such as R&D investment and total innovation investment.  
 
5.2.1 Linking the German recipient data to firm level information 
For the German case, we do not use Amadeus and patent data like in the Czech and French case 
studies, but link the recipient data to the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP). The MIP is an annual 
innovation survey that has been carried out since 1993 by the Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. The MIP constitutes the German part of the Community 
Innovation Survey which is nowadays conducted every second year in all European Member States. 
In the MIP, each year about 5,000 companies report about their innovation behavior. This database 
has the advantage that we have more information about the recipient firms than in the Czech and 
French case. In particular, we can consider other measures than patents for the innovation efforts of 
recipient firms and a control group of non-recipient firms. 
In total, there were 47,616 grants published on the Cohesion Policy websites of the German Länder. 
Out of those, 4,904 correspond to projects in the years 2011/2012 which cannot be used for any 
further analysis. Of the remaining projects, 5,606 could be assigned to firms that participated in the 
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Mannheim Innovation Panel at some point in time. These 5,606 were linked to 1,904 different 
recipient firms, i.e. program participants may have received multiple grants in the time period 2007-
2010. Note that the MIP is conducted since 1993, but that we can only use the most recent four years 
for our analysis, the time when the Cohesion Program under review has been active (2007-2010). As 
it turns out several of the 1,904 firms that were identified participated in the MIP, but not in the period 
of interest for our study. Thus we cannot use all 1,904 firms for our analysis, but only the subgroup of 
those that answered to the survey between 2007 and 2010. After removing observations with missing 
values in our main variables of interest, we end up with a final sample of 623 ‘treated’ observations. 
The number of observations that correspond to non-treated firms amounts to 21,226 firm-year 
observations.  
5.2.2 The estimator used for the German analysis 
As 50% of the firms are only observed once in our sample, we cannot apply panel data econometrics, 
like for instance the DiD estimator as we did in the cases of the Czech Republic and France. As a 
consequence, we can only apply estimators that can be applied to pooled cross-sections, including 
(parametric) selection models, instrumental variable estimators and matching techniques. In order to 
apply selection models and IV regressions, we would need a variable that determines the receipt of 
public funds, and that does not depend on outcome variables that are to be analyzed (here: innovation 
intensity, R&D intensity as well as R&D employment). Unfortunately our data does not contain 
variables that would be convincing candidates fulfilling these criteria. Therefore, we apply a matching 
estimator to the German data. 
Matching estimators have been applied and discussed by many scholars, amongst which 
Angrist (1998), Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b), and Lechner (1999, 
2000). Generally, matching estimators are used to answer the question of what treated units with a 
given set of characteristics would have done if they would not have received the treatment. The 
objective is to compare the two outcomes – when receiving and when not receiving a treatment – for 
the same unit. The problem is of course that we can observe at most one of these outcomes because 
the observed unit has either received a treatment or not. Holland (1986) refers to this as the 
fundamental problem of causal inference. Hence, the counterfactual situation of a treated firm (i.e. an 
untreated firm) is not directly observable and has to be estimated.  
Our fundamental evaluation question can be illustrated by an equation describing the average 
treatment effect on the treated individuals or firms, respectively: 
      | 1 | 1T CTTE E Y S E Y S     (1) 
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where Y
T
 is the outcome variable. The status S refers to the group: S=1 is the treatment group and S=0 
the non-treated firms. Y
C
 is the potential outcome which would have been realized if the treatment 
group (S=1) had not been treated. As previously explained, while E(Y
T
|S=1) is directly observable, it 
is not the case for the counterpart. E(Y
C
|S=1) has to be estimated. In the case of matching, this 
potential “untreated outcome” of treated firms is constructed from a control group of firms that did 
not receive innovation subsidies. The matching relies on the intuitively attractive idea to balance the 
sample of program participants and comparable non-participants. Remaining differences in the 
outcome variable between both groups are then attributed to the treatment. 
Because of a potential selection bias due to the fact that the receipt of a subsidy is not 
randomly assigned, E(Y
C
|S=1)   E(YC|S=0) and the counterfactual situation cannot simply be 
estimated as average outcome of the non-participants. Rubin (1977) introduced the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA) to overcome this selection problem, that is, participation and 
potential outcome are statistically independent for individuals with the same set of exogenous 
characteristics X. Thus, the critical assumption using the matching approach is whether we can 
observe the crucial factors determining the entry into the programme. If this assumption is valid, it 
follows that 
    | 1, | 0,C CE Y S X E Y S X    (2) 
 
Provided that there no systematic differences in the observed characteristics between both 
groups, the treatment effect can be written as: 
     | 1,  | 0,T CTTE E Y S X x E Y S X x     
    (3) 
In the present analysis, we conduct a nearest neighbour matching. More precisely, we pair each 
subsidy recipient with the single closest non-recipient. The pairs are chosen based on the similarity in 
the estimated probability of receiving such a subsidy, meaning the propensity score stemming from a 
probit estimation on the dummy indicating the receipt of subsidies S. Matching on the propensity 
score has the advantage not to run into the “curse of dimensionality” since we use only one single 
index as matching argument (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In addition of matching on the 
propensity score, we also require the observations of firms in the selected control group to belong to 
the same year and to have a similar patent stock than the firms in the treatment group.  
Last but not least, it is essential that there is enough overlap between the control and the treated group. 
We thus calculate the minimum and the maximum of the propensity scores of the potential control 
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group, and delete observations on treated firms with probabilities larger than the maximum and 
smaller than the minimum in the potential control group.  
The detail of our matching protocol is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: The matching protocol  
Step 1 Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain the propensity score  Pˆ X .  
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated firms with probabilities 
larger than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control group. (This step is 
also performed for other covariates that are possibly used in addition to the propensity score as 
matching arguments.) 
Step 3 Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms and delete it from that pool. 
Step 4 Calculate the Mahalanobis distance between this firm and all non-subsidized firms in order to find the 
most similar control observation.    
' 1
ij j i j i
MD Z Z Z Z

     
where   is the empirical covariance matrix of the matching arguments based on the sample of 
potential controls. If only the propensity score is used, there is no need to calculate a multidimensional 
distance. In that case, e.g. a Euclidian distance is sufficient. 
 
Step 5 In this application of the matching, we restrict the group of potential neighbors to firms active in the 
same industry as the particular treated firm. Select the observation with the minimum distance from 
the remaining sample. (Do not remove the selected controls from the pool of potential controls, so that 
it can be used again.)  
Step 6 Repeat steps 3 to 5 for all observations on subsidized firms. 
Step 7 Using the matched comparison group, the average effect on the treated can thus be calculated as the 
mean difference of the matched samples: 
 
 
 
with  being the counterfactual for i and n
T
 is the sample size (of treated firms). 
Step 8 As we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situation, an ordinary t-
statistic on mean differences is biased, because it does not take the appearance of repeated 
observations into account. Therefore, we have to correct the standard errors in order to draw 
conclusions on statistical inference. We follow Lechner (2001) and calculate his estimator for an 
asymptotic approximation of the standard errors. 
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5.2.3 Data and variable description 
The data used for this more in-depth evaluation of the EU Cohesion Policy stem from the Mannheim 
Innovation Panel (MIP), which is the German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
10
 
More precisely, we use the data covering the years 2007 to 2010.  
Our sample concerns innovative as well as non-innovative firms and covers manufacturing as 
well as business related services sectors.
11
 In total, the sample consists of 21,849 observations, out of 
which 11,443 are innovative firms and 623 received a public R&D subsidy from the EU Cohesion 
Policy. Table 2and Table 3 here below show the industry structure as well as the firm size distribution 
of our sample.  
Table 2: Size class distribution of the firms of the MIP sample 
Size class distribution Number of observations 
Min. - 4 1,366 
5 - 9 3,172 
10 - 49 8,480 
50 - 249 5,979 
250 – max. 2,915 
Total 21,912 
 
                                                     
10
 The CIS covers all of the EU Member States, Norway and Iceland using a largely harmonized 
questionnaire throughout participating countries. The CIS databases contain information on a cross-section of 
firms active in the manufacturing sector and in selected business services. 
11
 According to the 3
rd
 edition of the Oslo Manual – which is the definition followed by the CIS - an 
innovative firm is one that has implemented an innovation during the period under review. An innovation is 
defined as the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new 
marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace organization or external 
relations (see Eurostat and OECD, 2005). 
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Table 3: Industry distribution of the firms composing the MIP sample 
Industries 
Number of 
observations 
Food, beverages and tobacco 903 
Textiles, clothing and leather 662 
Paper, Wood, Publishing, Furniture 1,767 
Chemicals and refining 749 
Rubber, plastics, and non-metal mineral products 1,230 
Metal 1,571 
Machinery 1325 
Office equipment and electronics 733 
Communication technologies and precision instruments, optics 1,191 
Vehicles 614 
Other manufacturing industries incl. energy, water supply, construction 1,823 
Trade 1,217 
Transport 1,664 
ICT and R&D services 1188 
Other Business services 3,280 
Other services incl. banking, insurance, renting 1,995 
Total 21,912 
 
The receipt of a subsidy form the Cohesion Policy is denoted by a dummy variable equal to 
one for firms that received public R&D funding and zero otherwise.  
Outcome variables 
As outcome variables, we consider the internal R&D investment, RDINT, being the ratio of internal 
R&D expenditures
12
 to sales (multiplied by 100) as well as R&D employment, RDEMP, being the 
ratio of R&D employment to total employment (multiplied by 100). Further, we consider total 
innovation intensity (ratio of total innovation expenditure to sales multiplied by 100), investment 
intensity (investment/tangible assets * 100), and four dummy variables that indicate whether the firm 
has introduced at least one new product in (PD), one new process (PC), has abandoned one or more 
innovation projects (PA) or has ongoing innovation projects (PN).  
Control variables 
We use several control variables in our analysis likely to impact the fact of whether or not a firm 
applies and receives public support for its R&D activities. The number of employees takes into 
                                                     
12
  The CIS definition of R&D expenditure follows the Frascati Manual (OECD, 1993). 
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account possible size effects. As the firm size distribution is skewed, the variable enters in logarithms 
(LOGEMP).  
In addition, we include a dummy variable capturing whether or not a firm is part of a group 
(GP), and if so, whether it has its headquarters on national or foreign territory (FOREIGN). Firms that 
belong to a group with the parent company on national territory might be more likely to receive 
subsidies because they presumably have better information about governmental programmes due to 
their network linkages. From a governmental point of view, the funding decision might be more 
positively assessed if a firm is part of a group because of potential incoming knowledge spillovers that 
can result from foreign branches. On the other hand, firms belonging to a group with a foreign parent 
company, might be more susceptible to file subsidy applications in their home country. Furthermore, 
as explained in the previous section, the Flemish government maintains a special policy instruments 
for small and medium-sized firms, being eligible only if they are not part of a group. If a small firm is 
majority-owned by a large parent company, it would no longer qualify for the SME-programs. The 
dummies GP and FOREIGN thus also control for this type of company profile, and an a-priori 
judgement of whether the effect is positive or negative is complicated because of the two opposing 
arguments outlined above. 
We also control for the degree of international competition by including an export dummy in 
our analysis (EXPO). Firms that engage more heavily in foreign markets may be more innovative than 
others and, hence, more likely to apply for subsidies.  
We further include the labour productivity as a covariate, measured as sales per employee, 
LABPROD, since high labour productivity is often an important determinant for receiving public 
funds. 
Finally, a set of industry and time dummies control for unobserved heterogeneity across industries and 
time. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables of our sample. As we can see, almost all the 
variables are significantly different between the treated and the non-treated firms. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
  
Non-subsidized 
firms Subsidized firms 
p-value of t-test on 
mean difference  N=21,226 N= 623 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  
  Covariates   
LOGEMP 3.633 1.664 3.993 1.239 p<0.001 
LABPROD 0.245 2.347 0.146 0.215 p<0.001 
EAST 0.313 0.464 0.868 0.338 p<0.001 
GP 0.284 0.451 0.274 0.447 p=0.591 
FOREIGN 0.064 0.245 0.061 0.24 p=0.748 
EXPO 0.549 0.498 0.778 0.416 p<0.001 
  Outcome variables  
RDINT 1.527 5.785 5.43 12.278 p<0.001 
RDEMP
13
 3.608 10.584 11.957 19.154 p<0.001 
INNOINT 3.358 9.119 9.216 15.917 p<0.001 
INVINT
14
 37.72 93.863 51.554 124.60 p=0.047 
PD 0.351 0.477 0.584 0.493 p<0.001 
PC 0.294 0.456 0.435 0.496 p<0.001 
PA 0.139 0.346 0.108 0.31 p=0.013 
PN 0.397 0.489 0.632 0.483 p<0.001 
 
For instance, firms receiving subsidies from the Cohesion Policy are on average larger, more 
export oriented, belong to Eastern Germany more often and have a lower labour productivity. The 
descriptive statistics hence give us already a first indication that the selection criteria are correctly 
applied when choosing beneficiaries. While the beneficiary firms are more export oriented and larger 
than the non-beneficiaries, which are typical characteristics of R&D subsidy recipients, the Cohesion 
Policy recipients tend to belong to Eastern Germany more frequently and being less labour productive 
(hence in line with the Cohesion Policy selection criteria of brining depressed regions up to speed). 
With regards to the outcome variables, funded firms have on average higher internal R&D 
intensity, more R&D employees, higher total innovation expenditures, more product and process 
innovations, more ongoing innovation projects and less abandoned innovation projects, and, as can be 
seen by Figure 11 here below, are overall more often innovators. 
                                                     
13
 Due to missing values, the number of observations is of 16,748 for the non-subsidized firms and of 488 for 
the subsidized firms for R&D employment. 
14
 Due to missing values, the number of observations is of 9,291 for the non-subsidized firms and of 330 for the 
subsidized firms for innovation intensity. 
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Figure 11: Innovation behavior by subsidy status 
 
The econometric analysis in the next section will reveal to which extent these differences can be 
attributed to the treatment. 
5.2.4 Econometric results for the baseline specification 
In order to apply the matching estimator as presented in the previous section, we first have to estimate 
a probit model so as to obtain the predicted probability of receiving support from the EU Cohesion 
Policy, to be employed as matching argument subsequently. 
 We can see by the probit estimation in Table 5, with the exception of the coefficients of the 
foreign parent and the labor productivity variables, all the other coefficients are significantly different 
from zero and hence are important in driving the selection of into the EU funding scheme.  
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Table 5: Probit estimation 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
LOG EMPLOYMENT 0.140*** 0.016 
FOREIGN -0.072 0.093 
EXPO 0.383*** 0.050 
GP -0.191*** 0.056 
OST 1.299*** 0.050 
LABOR_PRO -0.059 0.077 
CONS -4.015*** 0.165 
Test on joint significance on industry dummies 2 (15) = 175.71*** 
Test on joint significance on time dummies 2 (3) = 46.22*** 
Number of observations 21,849 
 
As explained in the previous section, a necessary condition for the validity of the matching estimator 
is common support. In our case, zero observations are lost because no common support could be 
found. Hence, the matching estimation could be done on our entire sample. The results are displayed 
in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Matching results 
  
Selected control 
group, N=623 
Subsidized firms, 
N=623 
p-value on the t-test on 
mean difference 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.  
  Covariates   
LOGEMP 3.971 1.561 3.99 1.239 p=0.798 
EAST .870 .336 .868 .338 p=0.937 
FOREIGN .072 .259 .061 .239 p=0.457 
EXPO .775 .418 .778 .415 p=0.898 
GP .274 .447 .274 .447 p=1.000 
LABPROD .148 .228 .146 .215 p=0.853 
  Outcome variables  
RDINT 3.442 7.882 5.430 12.278 p<0.001 
INNOINT 6.903 13.585 9.215 15.917 p=0.009 
RDEMP 9.177 16.275 11.957 19.154 p=0.028 
PD .495 .499 .584 .493 p=0.003 
PC .373 .493 .435 .496 p=0.039 
PA .167 .373 .107 .310 p=0.004 
PN .526 .501 .632 .482 p<0.001 
INVINT 37.45 108.030 47.091 109.286 p=0.410 
 
As shown by Table 6, all our covariates are well balanced after the matching. Hence, we can 
conclude that our matching was successful and that we found a neighbor for each treated firm. Note 
that the two samples are also balanced with respect to the industries and year (not shown in table). 
The only variables where there still is a significant difference after the matching are our outcome 
variables. This difference could be attributed to the subsidy. With the exception of investment 
intensity, where no significant differences are found between treated and non-treated firms after the 
matching, all our other variables display significant differences after the matching. In other words, we 
can conclude that the null hypothesis of total crowding out can be rejected and that treated firms have 
higher R&D and innovation intensity, higher R&D employment intensity, are more likely to introduce 
new products and processes and are also more likely to have ongoing innovation projects and are less 
likely to have abandoned an innovation project than similar non-recipients, that is, the treated 
companies in the counterfactual situation of receiving no money from the Cohesion Policy.  
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5.2.5 Further results concerning only firms that show some innovation efforts 
As the published data on grant recipients does not allow identifying those projects that were meant for 
innovation exactly, we attempt to address this problem to some extent by limiting the analysis to firms 
that show some innovation activities or at least plans to innovate. We use the information from the 
MIP in order to restrict the analysis to such firms. Now we re-run the analysis from above using only 
those firms that indicated that they introduced a new product or process, or have reported that they 
either abandoned an innovation project or have at least one ongoing innovation project.  
For this estimation we use 480 innovating firms that received a grant from the Cohesion Policy, and 
10,963 firms that did not receive such grants. 
As we restrict our sample to innovators now, we can only investigate the continuous outcome 
variables meaningfully, that is, innovation intensity, R&D intensity, R&D employment intensity and 
investment intensity. 
After matching the recipient firms to the controls as done above but only using the innovating 
companies, we confirm that the results reported above hold with respect to R&D intensity and 
innovation intensity. The estimated treatment effects are 2.1% and 3.7% respectively. These are both 
significant at the 1% level. With respect to the R&D employment intensity, we find a similar 
treatment effect as in the table above which amounts to 2.7%, but this is no longer significant, though. 
This might be due to the reduced sample size, though. The investment intensity is insignificant as 
reported in the table above. 
5.2.6 Accounting for subsidies received from other sources 
Now we consider the robustness test mentioned in the introduction to the German country case. We 
are interested to what extent the estimated treatment effects are confounded with the receipt of 
innovation subsidies from other sources than the Cohesion Policy. 
Unfortunately, it actually turns out that the results reported above are confounded with other subsidy 
receipts. For this analysis, we can only use 2 out of the 4 years from the MIP, as only these years of 
the survey include question on other subsidies. In particular, we now consider a dummy variable 
indicating whether a firm has received public innovation funding from the German Federal 
Government (GOV). For this analysis we have 332 firms that received Cohesion Policy (CP) money 
and a control group of 10,620 firms that did not receive grants from the CP.  
When we perform the analysis as conducted in Table 6 with the reduced sample (the years 2008 and 
2010, as these include the subsidy variable), we find similar results as reported above. If we check 
however to what extent the firms have received other subsidies, it turns out that out of the 332 CP 
firms, 58% have also received money from the German Federal Government. This share, however, 
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only amounts to 37% percent in the 332 firms that were picked as nearest neighbors during the 
matching procedure. Thus, the results above are subject to an omitted variable bias. Therefore, we 
take the other subsidy receipt into account by adding the receipt of other subsidies as a matching 
criterion. Now we repeat the analysis reported in Table 6 but only match CP firms that also have 
received subsidies from the German government to non-CP firms that have received subsidies from 
the German government. Accordingly, CP firms that did not receive other subsidies are only matched 
to firms that did not receive other funding either. 
As we now use an additional matching criterion, that is, the receipt of other subsidies, but only have 
the sub-sample of 332 treated firms (the subsidy information is only available in two out of the four 
years), we now draw two nearest neighbor instead of a single control firm for each treated firm to 
avoid small sample problems. The quality of the matching estimator does not suffer from drawing two 
nearest neighbors instead of one, as the control group is still very rich in terms of potential candidates 
(more than 10,000 observations). 
The matching results are presented in Table 7. Again we see that the two samples are well balanced 
with respect to the employed covariates. In addition, we still find that the treatment effects are 
positive and significant for the R&D intensity, innovation intensity (at the 10% level) as well as the 
intensity of investment with respect to physical assets. However, compared to the previous analysis 
where the other subsidies were not taken into account, the magnitudes of the estimated treatment 
effects reduce slightly. Furthermore, we no longer find a positive impact of Cohesion Policy on R&D 
employment intensity. This may be due to the fact that most of the Cohesion Policy grants are 
relatively smaller than the average grant of the Federal Government, so that Cohesion Policy grants 
alone cannot finance an entire new R&D workplace in a firm. This is however speculative to a certain 
extent and would require attention in future research. 
In addition, we also see that the innovation indicator variables PD, PC, PA and PN do not differ 
anymore between the treated firms and their controls. This may be a data artifact as only innovating 
firms had to respond to the subsidy question in the survey affirmatively. Therefore, this results should 
not be causally interpreted in this particular setting.  
47 
 
Table 7: Matching results taking other subsidies into account 
  
Selected control 
group, N=664 
Subsidized firms, 
N=332 
p-value on the t-test on 
mean difference 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.  
  Covariates   
LOGEMP 3.94 1.41 3.93 1.20 p=0.854 
EAST 0.88 0.33 0.88 0.32 p=0.755 
FOREIGN 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23 p=0.859 
EXPO 0.77 0.42 0.77 0.42 p=0.923 
GP 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 p=0.646 
LABPROD 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.17 p=0.599 
  Outcome variables  
RDINT 4.41 9.69 6.20 13.80 p=0.045 
INNOINT 7.34 14.06 9.54 16.70 p=0.057 
RDEMP 11.05 17.72 12.48 19.49 p=0.388 
PD 0.55 0.50 0.60 0.49 p=0.186 
PC 0.39 0.49 0.43 0.50 p=0.321 
PA 0.16 0.36 0.13 0.34 p=0.382 
PN 0.54 0.50 0.62 0.49 p=0.028 
INVINT 31.92 63.76 53.19 122.85 p=0.021 
  Note: The nearest neighbours are also matched on industry and year. 
 
5.2.7 Taking the amount of the subsidy into account 
Finally, we had a closer look at the individual grants that were distributed in Germany. Among those 
that went to firms, there is a large heterogeneity in types and sizes of grants. While several apparently 
address innovation projects, many grants are very small grants, for instance support to visit a trade 
fair. Only few are larger (or very large grants), for instance for setting up a new production facility.  
Consequently, we investigated whether the identified treatment effect varies with the amount of 
funding the CP firms received. In order to do so, we take the estimated treatment effects from the 
previous subsection and regress those on the amount of funding.  
Unfortunately, we do not find strong correlations between the estimated treatment effect and the 
amount of the grant. As an example, we illustrate a result in the figure below. On the vertical axis, we 
plot the average treatment effect on the treated, and on the horizontal axis is the size of the grant. The 
straight, flat horizontal line displays the estimated average treatment effect on the treated we got out 
of our matching routine as reported above. In this case, we use the two years of the survey where we 
can control for the other German Federal subsidies. If the grant size would matter, we would expect 
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that the treatment effect increases as the grant size increases. As an illustration, we plot the result of a 
non-parametric regression of the treatment effect on the grant amount. We would expect that this 
curve has an upward slope, but unfortunately we do not find such pattern. Instead the estimated curve 
peaks before the end of the grant-size distribution and then decreases again.  
Figure 12: Correlation between treatment effect and size of CP grants 
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If we, however, regard the few very large grants at the right tail of the distribution as outliers (the 
three observations on the far right end of the horizontal axis) and base our analysis on the remaining 
data, we find an upward sloping curve. This result is also confirmed when we use parametric 
regressions. For instance, for R&D intensity we find a positive slope in an OLS regression of the 
treatment effect on the log of grant size which is significant at the 10% level. Thus we find at least 
some evidence that the innovation impacts increase with the amount distributed to the firms, on 
average. 
6 Conclusions 
The goal of this project was to demonstrate to what extent researchers can conduct quantitative 
evaluations of the EU Cohesion Policy at the firm level using publicly available information that had 
been provided by the EU Member States. In particular, enterprise support for innovation and research 
has been the focus. We chose to conduct treatment effects estimations for grant recipients located in 
the Czech Republic, France and Germany. 
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It turns out that the current reporting standards of the Member States enable researchers to apply some 
basic treatment effects models after the recipient data has been supplemented with firm-level 
information on innovation activities and other characteristics. In addition a control group of non-
funded firms has to be constructed. In our example, we used a combination of the recipient data with 
the Amadeus database which also allows drawing a control group and patent data that we collected 
from the PATSTAT database.  
In chapter 2 of this report, we recommend several improvements concerning the reporting standard of 
the Member States. For instance, not only publishing the name of the grant recipients but also their 
location (e.g. the name of the city) would ease the process of identifying the treated entities in external 
databases such as Amadeus. In addition, it would be essential that the Member States publish the 
project start and end dates in the beneficiary databases. Our applications to the French and Czech 
cases clearly show that it is essential to determine the exact timing of treatment receipts.  
Our policy conclusions can only be tentative as it would be desirable to have better quality 
information on the recipient data. For the Czech Republic and for France, we conducted difference-in-
difference estimations on the patent application activity of firms. In the Czech case, we identify a 
positive treatment effect of Cohesion Policy. Although the overall patent activity of Czech firms is 
declining during the program period, we find that the reduction in patenting is significantly less for 
the grant recipient firms when compared to a control group of firms that did not receive funding with 
the Cohesion Policy program. For France, we cannot identify a positive treatment effect with the same 
methodology. This does not mean, however, that there is no impact of Cohesion Policy on firms’ 
innovation activities in France. Instead we attribute this result to poorer data quality in the French 
case. As we point out in chapter 4 of the report, the French authorities did not report funding dates 
systematically. Thus, for many recipient firms, we cannot determine exactly when the grant has been 
received. This might bias our estimation of potential treatment effects.  
For the German case, we linked the recipient data not to the Amadeus data base and patent data, but 
used the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) which is the German part of the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS). Using this database allows investigating other, broader measures of innovation instead 
of just patenting. Applying non-parametric matching methods, we do actually find positive treatment 
effects for a number of different variables in a first estimation when we do not control for other 
subsidies the firms have received. Firms benefitting from Cohesion Policy program grants are more 
likely to introduce product innovations, are less likely to abandon innovation projects, spend more on 
R&D and innovation in general when compared to the counterfactual situation where these firms 
would not have obtained such a grant. Once we account for subsidies received from the German 
Federal Government, the estimated positive effects decrease slightly in magnitude, but we still find 
positive impacts that are statistically significant. However, we can no longer identify a separate effect 
of Cohesion Policy on R&D employment. In a final setting, we analyze to what extend the size of the 
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grant matters, and we find some support – although somewhat weaker in terms of statistical 
significance levels – for larger treatment effects, for instance concerning R&D investment, as the 
grant size increases.  
This first exercise of a quantitative evaluation of the Cohesion Policy program grants to firms shows 
that applications of econometric treatment effects estimators are possible with the publicly reported 
recipient data by the Member States. However, improving and harmonizing the reporting standards of 
the recipient data is certainly desirable, as it would ease the systematic linking of this information to 
other external databases. In addition, it is advisable that future evaluations allow more time between 
the programme completion and the evaluation itself. As external databases are typically only available 
with a certain lag in time, data on variables of interest can at the earliest be obtained two years after 
the program grant. If output measure such as employment or sales growth should be considered, even 
longer time lags are necessary.  
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7 Appendix A: Data information per region of beneficiary country 
      
 Country Region Format 
of the data 
Variables available Comments 
1. Luxembourg   Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
  
2. Belgium Wallonia Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Portfolio 
* Project 
* Amount (total and detail) 
  
    Prov. Hainaut Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Portfolio 
* Project 
* Amount (total and detail) 
  
    Flanders Excel * Project name 
* Beneficiary institution 
* Project description 
* Amount (total and detail) 
  
    Bruxelles Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
3. Germany Bayern Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
No categories per project type for most of the regions. 
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    Saarland Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
    Rheinland-Pfalz   ERROR ON THE PAGE* 
    Baden-Württemberg   * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
    Hessen   ERROR ON THE PAGE* 
    Thüringen Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
    Sachsen html * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
Separate sites for ESF and EFRE Programmes. 
    Sachsen-Anhalt Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
Separate sites for ESF and EFRE Programmes. 
    Schleswig-Holstein Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
    Mecklenburg-Vorpommern   ERROR ON THE PAGE* 
    Hamburg Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (granted/paid) 
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    Brandenburg Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (granted/paid) 
  
    Berlin      Website difficult to assess. No data information found. 
    Niedersachsen Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (granted/paid) 
Separate sites for ESF and EFRE Programmes 
/separate pdfs for Konvergenz& RWB. 
    Bremen Pdf idem Niedersachsen   
    Lüneburg Pdf idem Niedersachsen   
4. Denmark   html * Project name 
* Start date 
*Description 
  
5. Spain   Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (granted/paid) 
Harmonized for all regions. 
Same structure/content/format. 
 
6. Italia Veneto Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
    Lombardia Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
    Piemonte Excel * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
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    Valle d'Aosta Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount granted/paid 
Axis and activity. 
    Provincia autonoma di Bolzano - 
Alto Adige 
Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount granted/paid 
Axis and activity. 
    Sardegna Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
    Sicilia Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount granted/paid 
Axis and activity. 
    Calabria Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
Only 2 projects. 
    Basilicata   ERROR ON THE PAGE*   
    Puglia Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
  
    Campania Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount (total/paid) 
Containsactivitycodes. 
    Molise Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
Containsactivitycodes. 
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    Abruzzo Pdf * Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
No list of beneficiaries available. The only beneficiary 
"the region of Abbruzzo. 
    Lazio   ERROR ON THE PAGE*   
    Marche Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
Activity code / beneficiary list available by activity. 
    Umbria Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
Activity code / beneficiary list available by activity. 
    Toscana Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
Activity  code / beneficiary list available by activity. 
    Emilia Romagna Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
Activity  code / beneficiary list available by activity. 
    FriuliVeneziaGiulia     Website difficult to assess. No data information found. 
    Trento Excel * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
  
    Liguria     Website difficult to assess. No data information found. 
7. Portugal Centro Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
Classification per project, per activity, per project 
nomber. 
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    Norte     Website difficult to assess. No data information found. 
    Algarve Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
  
    Lisboa   ERROR ON THE PAGE* 
    Alentejo Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
Classification per project, per activity, per project 
nomber. 
    Açoras Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
  
    Madeira   ERROR ON THE PAGE* 
8. Malta   Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Competent ministry 
* Project description 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
  
9. Nederland Noord html * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
    Oost html * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
    Zuid   ERROR ON THE PAGE* 
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    West html * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount 
  
10. Ireland Border, Midland, Western html * Beneficiary 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Years per file. 
    Southern/Eastern   ERROR ON THE PAGE*   
11. France   pdf 
html 
excel 
* Beneficiary institution 
* Project description 
* Project name 
* Year 
* Amount (detail) 
  
12. UK North East   ERROR ON THE PAGE*   
    West North html * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount (detail) 
  
    York Shire and the Humber Pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount (detail) 
  
    East Midlands Pdf * Priority 
* Fin start and end date 
* Sponsor 
* Project title 
* Project description 
*Amount 
  
    West Midlands pdf * Project name 
* Applicant 
* date  
* amount 
  
    Cornwall And The Isles Of Scilly pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount (detail) 
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    East of England pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount (detail) 
  
    London Excel * Name of the beneficiary 
organization 
* Name of the project 
* Geographical coverage 
* Description (in project's own 
words) 
* Amount (detail) 
  
    South East html   Link to different website: 
http://www.seeda.co.uk/what-we-do/european-
investment/erdf/existing-erdf-projects. 
    South West pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount (detail) 
Separate pdf file per activity. 
    West wales and the valleys pdf * Priority 
* Sponsor 
* Project title 
* Project description 
*Amount 
  
    East Wales pdf * Priority 
* Sponsor 
* Project title 
* Project description 
*Amount 
  
    Scotland (Highlands and Island) html * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
  
    Nothern Ireland html Searchengine   
59 
 
    Gibraltar html * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
  
13. Bulgaria Severozapaden pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Separate pdf file per project type: only data on 
environment OP available in English.In Bulgarian, 
more data seems to beavailable. 
    Severentsentralen pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Separate pdf file per project type: only data on 
environment OP available in English. In Bulgarian, 
more data seems to beavailable. 
    Severoitztochen pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Separate pdf file per project type: only data on 
environment OP available in English. In Bulgarian, 
more data seems to beavailable. 
    Yugoiztochen pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Separate pdf file per project type: only data on 
environment OP available in English. In Bulgarian, 
more data seems to beavailable. 
    Yugozapaden pdf * Beneficiary institution* Project 
name* Amount 
Separate pdf file per project type: only data on 
environment OP available in English. In Bulgarian, 
more data seems to beavailable. 
    Yuzhuntsentralen pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Separate pdf file per project type: only data on 
environment OP available in English.In Bulgarian, 
more data seems to beavailable. 
14. Estonia   html  Information only available in Estonian 
15. Sweden   html   Same structure for all regions. Search engine ESF 
Council website : http://www.esf.se/sv/Rotsida-for-
topmeny/In-english/. 
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16. Austria Burgenland pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
  
    Niederösterreich pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Only information found on regional competitiveness 
and employment projects. 
    Wien pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Only information found on regional competitiveness 
and employment projects. 
    Kärnten   ERROR ON THE PAGE* 
    Steiermark pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
  
    Oberösterreich pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
  
    Salzburg pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
  
    Tirol pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
  
    Vorarlberg pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
  
17. Cyprus   pdf   Links empty or not working in English. They seem to 
work in Greek and/or Cypriots. 
18. Lithuania       Website difficult to assess. No data information found.  
19. Lavia   excel   No data could be found in English.  
20. Hungry same site for all regions   No data could be found in English.  
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21. CzechRepublic Praha excel    
    StredniCechy pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Detailed information available only in Czech. The 
titles are also available in English. 
    Jihozapad pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Detailed information available only in Czech. The 
titles are also available in English. 
    Severozapad Excel * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Detailed information available only in Czech. The 
titles are also available in English. 
    Severovychod   ERROR ON THE PAGE  
    Jihovychod Excel 
Pdf 
* Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Detailed information available only in Czech. The 
titles are also available in English. 
    Stredni Morava word * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Detailed information available only in Czech. The 
titles are also available in English. 
    Moravskoslezsko     Website difficult to access. No data information found.  
22. Poland Lodskie RAR * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Classified per activity.  
    Mazowieckie RAR 
Excel 
* Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Classified per activity. 
    Malopolskie RAR 
Excel 
same for all regions   
23. Romania Nord-Vest searchengine   Same structure for all regions.  
24. Slovenia   html * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
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* Amount 
25. Slovakia Bratislavsky excel 
pdf 
* Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Information only available in Slovak. Same for all 
regions. 
26. Finland all regions html * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Same structure for all the regions. 
27. Greece  all regions pdf * Beneficiary institution 
* Project name 
* Amount 
Information only found in Greek. 
* “ERROR ON THE PAGE” indicates that the region’s website did not work at the time when we tried to access it. 
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8 Appendix B: Example of a data reporting structure 
Format: excel                         
Reportinglanguage: English             
                
Name of  
beneficiary, 
complete 
address and 
legal form 
ID Operation 
Operational 
Programme 
Fund 
EU 
  European Union funding 
Duration 
of the 
projects in 
months 
(including 
exact start 
and end 
date) 
Date of 
allocation  
Amountsallocated 
(in €) 
Date of 
interim 
payment 
(in €) 
Total 
Amounts 
paid from 
the start 
of the 
Project (in 
€) 
Total 
amount 
spent at 
the end of 
year 1 (in 
€) 
Total 
amount 
spent at 
the end of 
year 2 (in 
€) 
Total 
amount 
spent at 
the end of 
year 3 (in 
€) 
Status 
                
Private firm beneficiaries 
Purpose of the grant: R&D and innovation            
Beneficiary 1              
Beneficiary 2              
Beneficiary 3              
…               
Purpose of the grant: Infrastructure            
Beneficiary 1              
Beneficiary 2              
Beneficiary 3              
…               
Purpose of the grant: Environment            
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Beneficiary 1              
Beneficiary 2              
Beneficiary 3              
…               
Etc.               
                
National/regional/local authorities 
Purpose of the grant: R&D and innovation           
Beneficiary 1              
Beneficiary 2              
Beneficiary 3              
…               
Purpose of the grant: Infrastructure            
Beneficiary 1              
Beneficiary 2              
Beneficiary 3              
…               
Purpose of the grant: Environment            
Beneficiary 1              
Beneficiary 2              
Beneficiary 3              
…               
Etc.               
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Universities and research centers 
Purpose of the grant: R&D and innovation           
Beneficiary 1              
Beneficiary 2              
Beneficiary 3              
…               
Purpose of the grant: Infrastructure            
Beneficiary 1              
Beneficiary 2              
Beneficiary 3              
…               
Purpose of the grant: Environment            
Beneficiary 1              
Beneficiary 2              
Beneficiary 3              
…               
Etc.                           
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9 Appendix C: Linking databases via text field searches 
The following text describes the matching of the beneficiaries of the Cohesion Policy 
programme of the European Union with the company data of the Amadeus database provided 
by Bureau van Dijk.  
One major drawback encountered during this exercise was linked to missing information of 
the programme beneficiaries. Because the managing authorities are only obliged to report the 
names of the beneficiaries but not their entire address, the only additional information about 
the locations of the beneficiaries can be implicitly determined by the NUTS-3 code. Because 
the NUTS-3 code is not represented in the Amadeus database, it is necessary to append this 
information using the postal code and/or the city name of the beneficiary. For some countries, 
i.e. France, this can easily be achieved by using the postal code per NUTS 3 unit, because the 
department is a hierarchical part of it. For other countries, like Germany, the connection 
between postal codes and the NUTS-3 regions is much more ambiguous, resulting in multiple 
NUTS-3 regions per postal code and vice versa.  
The inclusion of additional information besides the beneficiary name would thus be important 
to reduce false positive matches. The latter are usually generated by heuristically matching 
algorithms in combination with weak specifications (beneficiary name only versus full 
address). Having the full address of each beneficiary per region would thus help to avoid this 
kind of error.  
The regional beneficiary data is matched to Amadeus at the country level, that is, we perform 
separate searches for all selected countries. The programme that is used for the matching is 
called SearchEngine (developed by Thorsten Doherr for the Centre of European Economic 
Research). In a first step, this tool creates a kind of dictionary, containing all the words of 
company names of the country specified in the Amadeus data, along with an occurrence 
counter for every entry and supporting tables that link the words back to the original records 
of the Amadeus table (companies). This counter is the base for the heuristics of the matching 
algorithm. Secondly, each beneficiary name will be separated into words. Each word is 
associated with the occurrence counter of the corresponding dictionary entry or with the 
average occurrence if no entry was found. The occurrence reflects the identification potential 
of the word. A relatively low occurrence has a high potential to identify the company, 
because the resulting list of potential hits is small. Legal forms as part of a companies’ names 
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have for instance a very high occurrence and because of this reason a very large list of 
potential hits. Each list represents a percentage of the whole identity of a beneficiary name. 
This percentage is inversely proportional to the size of the list. By combining all potential hit 
lists, starting with the smallest, it is possible to rank the combined hits by the summarized 
percentage of the lists they are part of. 
The main advantage of this algorithm is its potential to ignore non-identifying filler words, 
changes of the legal status and different positions of the words. The algorithm automatically 
adjusts itself to the specific combination of words of a beneficiary name. If a name consists 
of a few words with a high identification potential among some words with a low potential, 
the algorithm ignores the lesser important words. If all words are equally important, the 
algorithm is more restrictive and ignoring words is not an option. 
Because the algorithm is word based, it is very prone to typing errors that can transform a 
common word into a very unique word or into a word that is not represented by the 
dictionary. This problem can be circumvented by introducing n-grams to the algorithm. An n-
gram is a part of a word with the length n. The complete representation of a word with the 
length L consists of max(L-n,0)+1 n-grams. For example, the name "Thorsten" is represented 
by five 4-grams: Thor, hors, orst, rste, sten. The dictionary of the SearchEngine then contains 
n-grams instead of complete words. The impact of typing errors on an n-gram based 
dictionary is much smaller than on a word based dictionary because one will only loose a 
couple of chunks of a word but not the entire word. Because this more tolerant approach can 
result in too many false positive hits, it should always be done after the normal matching and 
only for beneficiaries without a match. 
The main problem of heuristic matches is false positives, resulting from matches with a 
relative high identification. There is a trade-off between getting the most correct hits and 
getting too many false hits. It is like searching the internet using Google. Only the user knows 
the context of the search and sometimes the first result page has no matching entry. This 
analogy leads to the conclusion that manual control of the matches is required to distinguish 
between correct and false positives. Additional external information, like the NUTS-3 regions 
of searched beneficiaries and found companies, can further reduce the false positives to 
minimize the manual effort. 
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10 Appendix D: An overview on treatment effects estimators 
In this section econometric models that tackle the problem of endogeneity of the treatment in the 
evaluation of public grants are discussed.
15
 As treatment effects models usually consider discrete 
treatments we start with such methodologies, and briefly mention possible extensions for multiple or 
continuous treatments afterwards. 
10.1 Discrete Treatments 
In this subsection, we focus on methods that are applicable to cross-sectional data, and second those 
that require panel data. Models allow estimating different kinds of treatment effects: the average 
treatment effect, the local average treatment effect, the marginal treatment effect, the average 
treatment effect on the treated and the treatment effect on the untreated (see e.g. Heckman et al., 2001, 
for a discussion of treatment effects commonly used in programme evaluation literature). Here, we 
focus on the treatment effect on the treated (TT). Suppose we consider subsidies for R&D activities. 
Thus our basic evaluation question would be: “How much would a firm that has received a subsidy 
have spent on R&D activities if it would not have been subsidized, on average?”, or expressed as 
equation:
16
 
   1 1T CTT E Y S E Y S     , (3) 
whereY
T
 refers to the potential outcome (e.g. R&D expenditure) of firms that receive subsidies, and Y
C
 
to the situation where they do not. S indicated the treatment status. It is equal to 1 for treated firms and 
zero otherwise. Thus, the TT results from comparing the actual outcome of subsidized firms with their 
outcome in case of not receiving a grant. The approach of measuring potential outcomes goes back to 
Roy (1951). The outcome  1TE Y S   can be estimated by the sample mean of Y in the group of 
subsidized firms. In order to identify  1CE Y S   one needs to make further assumptions. The latter 
cannot simply be calculated from non-subsidized firms as 
   1 0C CE Y S E Y S    (4) 
due to non-random assigned treatments. This would only be valid in an experimental setting where 
subsidies are granted randomly to firms, which is obviously not the case in current innovation policy 
practice.  
                                                     
15
  This section draws heavily from the surveys of Heckman et al. (1999) and Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000, 
2002), and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).  
16
 All variable are measured at the firm level i (with i = 1,...,N), but we omit the index i for convenience. 
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Suppose the outcome equation has following form 
if 1
if 0
Y X S U S
Y X U S
 

   
  
 (5) 
where X denotes a set of exogenous variables, their parameters and  is the impact of the treatment. 
U is the error term with mean zero and is assumed to be uncorrelated with X.  
Since S is not randomly assigned - as this is most likely not the case when subsidies are the subject of 
the analysis - U will be correlated with S. This happens because the grant decision is expected to be 
related to firm characteristics that may well affect Y as well. If this is the case, and one is unable to 
control for all the characteristics affecting Y and S simultaneously, some correlation between S and U 
is expected. Therefore, standard econometric approaches that regress Y on X and S are not valid. 
In order to solve this problem, one assumes that the subsidy receipt can be written as 
*S Z V  , (6) 
where D* is an index depending on a set of variables Z and parameters , as well as an error term V. 
The receipt of a subsidy happens when D* is larger than zero: 
1 if * 0
0 otherwise
S
S

 

. (7) 
In the following we refer to this as selection equation. 
10.1.1 The Heckman Selection Estimator 
The application of the Heckman estimator requires the existence of one regressor that is not included 
in the outcome equation, but that has a non-zero coefficient in the selection equation, and is 
independent of V. Moreover, the joint distribution of U and V either has to be known or one has to 
able to estimate it. This estimator directly controls for the part of the error term U that is correlated 
with S. Typically, scholars assume that U and V follow a joint normal distribution, which leads to the 
conditional outcome equation: 
 
 
1
1
| 1
| 0 1
V V
V V
Z Z
E Y S X
Z Z
E Y S X
 
  
 
 
 
 


   
       
   
    
       
    
 (8) 
where the last term in each equation represents the error term conditional on S. This separates the true 
impact of S from the selection process, which accounts for differences among funded and non-funded 
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firms. The TT can be obtained by regressing S* on Z, and running a least squares estimation on 
equation (6).  
Note that one would assume that the parameters of X are the same for subsidized and non-subsidized 
firms in this case. One can easily relax that assumption: then we would omit S in eq. (8) and estimate 
the two equations separately with least squares. In order to obtain TT, we calculate  
    
1
1 0 1 0
V V
Z Z
X
 
     
 

   
       
   
 (9) 
where subscript 1 refers to the parameters of the treated group's equation, and subscript 0 to the non-
treated (see e.g. Heckman et al., 2003). 
This model has often been criticized as it is quite demanding on assumptions about the structure of the 
model. Several generalizations of the fully parametric model have been suggested in the literature. 
Among others, semiparametric variants of the Heckman model include Gallant and Nychka (1987), 
Cosslett (1991), Newey (1999), or Robinson's (1988) partial linear model. Note, however, that in such 
models the intercept in the outcome equation is no longer identified. A precise estimate of the 
intercept is required for deriving TT, though. Heckman (1990) and Andrews and Schafgans (1998) 
developed estimators for the identification of TT.  
10.1.2 Instrumental variable regressions (IV) 
In contrast to the Heckman model, the IV regression does not involve estimating a selection equation. 
Suppose Z* is a valid instrument, i.e. it is (highly) correlated with the treatment dummy S, we can find 
a transformation, g, such that g(Z*) is uncorrelated with U conditional on X, and Z* is not completely 
determined by X. This amounts to standard instrumental variable regression. 
17
 
Although this is a very simple estimator as it does not require estimating the selection equation, it has 
a major drawback: it is not easy to think about a variable that could serve as a valid instrument. Recall 
that it should, for instance, determine the subsidy receipt but not R&D, i.e. a simultaneous 
requirement of "participation determination" and "non-influence on the outcome of participation". As 
there are usually no straightforward candidates for instrumental variables available, a convincing 
application of this estimator is rare. Even if longitudinal data are available, the common practice to 
use lagged values does not necessarily solve the problem as lags are often highly correlated with 
future values of the variable.  
                                                     
17
 Alternatively one could, of course, estimate a simultaneous equation model with 2SLS or 3SLS for example. 
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10.1.3 Matching estimators 
The matching estimator is a non-parametric method and has one main advantage: no particular 
functional form of equations has to be specified. The disadvantages are strong assumptions and heavy 
data requirements.  
The main purpose of the matching estimator is to re-establish the conditions of an experiment. The 
matching estimator attempts to construct a correct sample counterpart for the treated firms' outcomes 
if they had not been treated by pairing each treated firm with members of a comparison group. Under 
the matching assumption, the only remaining difference between the two groups is the actual subsidy 
receipt. 
Rubin (1977) introduced the so-called conditional independence assumption (CIA) to solve the 
problem arising in eq.(4). This condition means that the receipt of subsidies and potential outcome are 
independent for firms with the same set of exogenous characteristics 
 , |T CY Y S X x  . (10) 
The condition helps to overcome the problem that  | 1CE Y S   is unobservable. If the conditional 
independence assumption is valid, then  | 0,CE Y S X x   can be used as a measure of potential 
outcome for the subsidy recipients. However, the CIA is only fulfilled if all variables that influence 
the outcome and selection status S are known and available in the dataset. In that case the equation  
    | 1, | 0,C CE Y S X x E Y S X x      (11) 
holds, and the average outcome of subsidized firms in the absence of a subsidy can be calculated from 
a sample of comparable ("matched") firms. Note, however, that matching requires a further 
assumption, which is  0 Pr 1| 1S X    in order to guarantee that all treated firms have a 
counterpart in the non-treated population, and that every firm constitutes a possible subsidy recipient. 
However, this does not ensure that this happens in every sample. Thus, matching requires a common 
support restriction. If the samples of treated and non-treated firms would have no or only little overlap 
in X, matching is not applicable to obtain consistent estimates. 
If the CIA holds and common support is given, the treatment effect on the treated would consequently 
amount to 
    | 1, | 0,T CE Y S X x E Y S X x        (12) 
which can be estimated using the sample means of both groups.  
Usually X contains a large number of variables, so that matching can be very difficult due to the high 
dimensionality of X. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1984) have shown that conditioning the matching 
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on the propensity score (the probability to receive a subsidy) Pr(X) instead of X is a valid procedure. 
This reduces the curse of dimensionality, and makes matching feasible as one can use a single index. 
Lechner (1998) suggested a hybrid matching, that is, one conditions on Pr(X) and a subset of X; for 
example, industry dummies if one wants to ensure that a matched control observation is in the same 
industry as the treated firm. 
The comparison group for each treated firm is chosen to a predefined criterion of proximity. Having 
defined the neighborhood for each treated firm, the next issue is the choice of appropriate weights for 
non-treated observations within the neighborhood, such that TT is obtained as  
 ˆ i ij j
i T j C
Y w Y
 
 
  
 
  . (13) 
Common procedures are nearest neighbor matching, that is, the weight is set to unit value for the 
closest match, and zero otherwise. So, one ends up with one single non-subsidized twin firm for each 
treated one. If one picks more than one neighbor, one could, for instance, set the weights to equal 
value for each control observation. Kernel matching uses all firms in the control group for each 
treated firm, and assigns kernel weights according to proximity in X or Pr(X) to each control 
observation. 
10.1.4 Difference-in-difference estimators 
The difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator uses the idea that a good guess for the outcome in the 
absence of a treatment, would be an observation of a treated firm in an earlier period where it did not 
receive a subsidy. In order to control for macroeconomic changes over time, DiD relates the 
development of treated firms over time to a control group of non-treated firms to eliminate effects that 
are due to changes over time. Thus, the DiD estimator compares subsidized firms and a control group 
of non-subsidized firms before (t0) and after (t1) the treatment: 
         
1 0 1 0
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0DiDTT t t t tE Y S E Y S E Y S E Y S          (14) 
The obvious disadvantage of this estimator is that panel data are required. For studies on R&D 
subsidies, this actually amounts to a heavy data requirement, as not only two periods have to be 
available at least, but in particular observations in the case of subsidy receipts and observations on 
previous periods where the same firm did not receive a subsidy. As subsidies are often longer term 
research projects, and firms get multiple grants over time, it actually turns out to be difficult to 
construct a database that allows an appropriate application of DiD in practice.  
One underlying assumption in the DiD estimator is that treated and non-treated firms react similar to 
shocks that occur over time (aside of the treatment). However, as evidence shows treated and non-
treated firms are often very different in characteristics, which would suggest that they may also react 
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differently to macroeconomic shocks. In order to overcome this potential bias the conditional 
difference-in-difference estimator (CDiD) can be applied. It is a combination of matching and DiD. 
There one does not employ a general control group, but matches comparable firms to the treated firms 
in the period before receiving the treatment, and compares the evolution of two comparable groups 
over time. Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) suggest employing CDiD for repeated cross-sections if no 
panel data is available. This requires matching three times: find the controls for the subsidized firms 
before the treatment, and controls before and after the treatment. 
10.2 Continuous Treatments 
As mentioned earlier the previous estimators focus on binary treatments, that is, one distinguishes 
only the subsidy receipt and no subsidy receipt. However, in the R&D context, the size of the 
treatment may play an important role for the treatment effects, of course. We just briefly refer to 
extensions of the binary treatment case. 
Lee (1994) and Honoré et al. (1997) provide semiparametric selection models when the treatment is 
not only a binary variable, but of Tobit-type, i.e. it is zero for the non-treated firms but positive 
continuous for treated firms (the value is the amount of the subsidy). 
IV regressions are not limited to discrete treatment. The same procedure would also be valid if the 
amount of funding is available. See e.g. Wooldridge (2000) for a comprehensive discussion on how to 
obtain treatment effects with IV regressions. 
Imbens (2000) has introduced a treatment effects estimator that allows to account for heterogeneous 
but still discrete treatments. The multiple treatments could either be different programmes, e.g. a 
subsidy of a local government versus an EU subsidy, or the size of a subsidy could be grouped into 
different classes, e.g. low, medium, high subsidy. Similarly, Gerfin and Lechner (2002) present a 
matching approach for heterogeneous treatments. 
Recently, Hirano and Imbens (2004) suggested estimating dose-response functions using a 
generalized propensity score method. This is, like matching, a non-parametric method but is suitable 
for continuous treatments. 
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